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ABSTRACT
A Method of Weil Sum in Multivariate Quadratic Cryptosystem. (May 2007)
Tomohiro Harayama, B.S., Kyoto University;
M.S., Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Donald K. Friesen
A new cryptanalytic application is proposed for a number theoretic tool Weil sum
to the birthday attack against multivariate quadratic trapdoor function. This new
customization of the birthday attack is developed by evaluating the explicit Weil sum
of the underlying univariate polynomial and the exact number of solutions of the asso-
ciated bivariate equation. I designed and implemented new algorithms for computing
Weil sum values so that I could explicitly identify some class of weak Dembowski-
Ostrom polynomials and the equivalent forms in the multivariate quadratic trapdoor
function. This customized attack, also regarded as an equation solving algorithm for
the system of some special quadratic equations over finite fields, is fundamentally
different from the Gro¨bner basis methods. The theoretical observations and experi-
ments show that the required computational complexity of the attack on these weak
polynomial instances can be asymptotically less than the square root complexity of
the common birthday attack by a factor as large as 2n/8 in terms of the extension de-
gree n of F2n . I also suggest a few open problems that any MQ-based short signature
scheme must explicitly take into account for the basic design principles.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
The recent advancements of computing power and models are constantly changing
the cryptographic landscapes of all the cryptographic schemes. It is now known that
the Shor’s quantum algorithm [1] can solve the integer factorization and discrete
logarithm problems in polynomial time of input size.
This fact strongly indicates that RSA cryptosystem (Section 8.2. [2]) based on the
computational hardness of integer factorization problem (Section 3.2. [2]) as well as
the Diffie-Hellman schemes (Protocol 12.47. [2]) based on discrete logarithm problem
(Section 3.6. [2]) are subject to the continuous erosion of the security of their underly-
ing reference problems. And it is actually true that Elliptic Curve cryptosystems such
as ECDSA or ECDH (cf. [3]) are also involved in this challenging reality. Therefore it
is very important for cryptography researchers to seek more new constructions of the
secure and efficient public-key cryptosystems whose reference problems are expected
to remain secure even under the future advancement of computing powers and mod-
els. One such promising construction is the NP-hard problem regarding systems of
multivariate quadratic equations over finite fields.
To see more specifically, assume that p is a prime (2 or odd) and Fq the finite
field of order q = pn for n ≥ 1. We denote F ∗q = Fq \ {0}. Fq is often regarded
as a vector space F np over Fp of dimension n with some basis. A MQ problem is
a problem of solving n variables xi ∈ Fp of the randomly generated system of m
quadratic equations over Fp (often 1 ≤ m ≤ n) and this problem is known to be NP-
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Mathematical Cryptology.
2complete [4, 5] and hard on average as well [6]. Multivariate quadratic cryptosystem
is a public-key cryptosystem based on the computational hardness obtained from
this MQ problem (e.g., Matsumoto-Imai [7], HFE and variations: [5, 8, 9]. Tame
transformation method and variations: [10, 11, 12]. Others: [13, 14]).
The MQ problem is, in fact, not rare in cryptography. For example, the compu-
tational hardness of MQ problems has many interesting combinatorial and algebraic
features (cf. [15]) that are crucial for the security of the widely deployed symmet-
ric ciphers such as Rijndael-AES [16, 17]. It is also expected that MQ problem is
probably secure under the quantum computing model. In fact, there are still many
potential approaches from which new types of multivariate quadratic cryptosystems
might be designed.
In a multivariate quadratic cryptosystem, some trapdoor structure (denoted by
MQ(p, n,m)-trapdoor) is designed into the public system F (x) = (P1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . ,
Pm(x1, . . . , xn)) of m quadratic polynomials in n variables over Fp so that the equa-
tion z = F (x) for given z ∈ F np can be secretly inverted with the designed trapdoor
information. The concrete MQ-trapdoor is actually a certain subset of the family
of all the possible quadratic polynomials over Fp, whereby choosing one function in
MQ(p, n,m)-trapdoor is presumably regarded as choosing one mapping from the set
of all possible mappings F np → Fmp (cf. random mappings, Section 2.1.6 [2]). The
existing trapdoor structures often consist of 3 mappings as F = S ◦ C ◦ T with
(S,C, T ) ∈ ALn(F2)×MQ(F n2 , Fm2 )×ALn(F2), where ALn(F2) and ALm(F2) denote
the set of all invertible affine mappings over F n2 and F
m
2 , resp. and MQ(F
n
2 , F
m
2 )
denotes the set of all possible systems of m quadratic polynomials in n variables over
F2.
In contrast to the well-known public-key cryptosystems such as RSA cryptosys-
tem with parameter domain Z/(n) or the Diffie-Hellman key agreement with Z/(p)
3with prime p whose moduli must usually be assigned quite large values for practical
applications (e.g. RSA: 1024-2046 bits, DH: 512-1024 bits), most of the practical
multivariate quadratic cryptosystems apply characteristic p of relatively small prime
(e.g.,2). As a result multivariate cryptosystems do not require any intensive use of
prime number generation or primality test mechanism (Chapter 4. [2]).
One of the earliest instances of multivariate quadratic cryptosystems is the Hid-
den Field Equation (HFE) cryptosystem proposed by Patarin in 1996 [5] which is a
generalization of the Matsumoto-Imai (MI) cryptosystem [7, 18]. The MI system uses
a well-known permutation monomial x2
α+1 over F2n (cf. Theorem 7.8. [19]). Patarin
extended this monomial approach to quadratic multinomial approach to gain secu-
rity by sacrificing the bijectivity and simplicity in the inversion step of the central
polynomials.
In comparison to many other cryptosystems, a multivariate cryptosystem usually
gives a short signature size when applied to a digital signature scheme. For example,
a digital signature scheme Quartz [20, 21] which is based on the HFE system as a
trapdoor function can maintain 128-bit signature size (Section 6.1.3. [22]) even under
the recent developments of cryptanalyses [23, 24, 6, 25]. With SFLASH [26] which
uses the permutation monomial of MI system, the modified version of SFLASH v.2
[27] is still secure with the 259-bit signature size.
The quadratic portions of the HFE polynomials and the polynomials of other
types of MQ schemes were known as Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials [28] and they
have been studied in various contexts [29, 30, 31, 32, 33]. A few new classes of
Dembowski-Ostrom permutation polynomials were also reported in [29]. Although it
is yet to be investigated whether we can develop any cryptographic application from
these new Dembowski-Ostrom permutation multinomials, one of the Dembowski-
Ostrom permutation polynomials in [29] fα(x) = xTr(x) + (α + 1)x
2 over F2kn (n
4is odd, α 6= 0, 1) has the nontrivial compositional inverse formula (Theorem 1. [34]).
Since the set of Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials is not closed by the functional com-
position, one may need to determine further permutation polynomials through an in-
dividual investigation rather than some systematic enumeration (cf. Chapter 7. [19]).
Interestingly, the Dembowski-Ostrom permutation polynomial with the inverse for-
mula [29] is an extension of the permutation monomial used in the MI cryptosystem
and their cryptographic applications should be examined by further research.
On the security of HFE polynomials, Patarin’s early analysis (Sections 7.2. and
7.3. [5]) lists several classes of weak polynomial keys, and their weakness is char-
acterized by the affine multiple properties (Example 3.55. [19]). Some of the weak
polynomials in the list are special types of well-known permutation polynomials such
as Dickson polynomials (Theorem 7.16. [19]) and Dobbertin polynomials [35]. If one
can determine an affine q-polynomial A(x) in Fqn [x] of f(x) (i.e., affine multiple)
which is divisible by f(x), then all the roots of f(x) reside in the set of roots of A(x).
Patarin generalized the previous attack on MI system [18] into this affine multiple
attack in order to empirically classify the class of weak polynomials used in HFE
system. To see if a given HFE polynomial f(x) has the affine multiple A(x, y) (where
A(x) = y) of low Hamming weight in the exponents of y, one must actually compute
the affine multiple of f(x) (Section 7.3. [5]).
Many new results regarding the algebraic attacks have been published so far [36,
37, 25, 24, 38] over the developments of the symmetric cryptosystem such as AES,
stream ciphers and the asymmetric cryptosystems such as multivariate schemes. One
of the prominent features of these algebraic attacks is that the time complexity of
attacks depends on the degree of some intermediate polynomials appearing during
the computation [6]. In response to these algebraic cryptanalyses, many other vari-
ations and modifications have been developed over the past ten years (HFE and
5variations: [5, 8]. Tame transformation and variations: [11, 12]. Others: [13, 14, 9]).
The attacks against the specific signature schemes were also developed [39, 40, 41, 42].
The equivalent classes existing in the set of the HFE polynomials are also exploited
in [43].
B. Contributions and Organizations
The trapdoor structure is the most important component in any MQ-based encryption
or digital signature scheme. The security of MQ-trapdoors designed in the multivari-
ate quadratic cryptosystems determine the required bit-lengths of message blocks or
signatures as well as other computational resources in order to achieve the desired
security level. Since the existing MQ schemes have relatively large key size, the ad-
vantages such as having short block and signatures are precious ingredients in the
study of multivariate cryptosystems.
However, when a multivariate signature scheme provides a short signature size, a
birthday attack is generally applicable to the underlying systemMQ(p, n,m)-trapdoor
F np → Fmp . The common notion of this attack is that the required time complexity for
randomly generated polynomials is the square root of the size of ranges, i.e, O(pm/2)
(cf. [20], Facts. 2.26, 2.27 [2]). Motivated by this particular property of short sizes
for message blocks or signatures, we have investigated the security of generic MQ
trapdoors and the associated MQ signature schemes under birthday attacks. In order
to arrive at a new approach quite different from the currently existing ones in the
literature, we develop a novel application of the theory of character and Weil sum of
finite fields (Chapter 5. [19]) to multivariate quadratic cryptosystems.
We note that the applications of the bound results of exponential sums (including
Weil sums) usually appeared in the literatures on the problems of bit-security (or
6partial security) of RSA, DH, ECDH, DSA, ECDSA etc. [44, 45, 46, 47], whereby the
cryptosystems rely for their security on the integer factorization or discrete logarithm.
Our approach is clearly different from any other previously proposed application such
as the bound results of the Weil sum to analysis of partial security. In this paper we
consider the exact evaluation (cf. [30, 31, 32, 33]) instead of the bound approach of
Weil sums and examine the full security of a generic MQ trapdoor function in MQ
problem without assuming the availability of any partial private information. As far
as we know the exact Weil sum method is the first ever developed for and applied to
multivariate cryptosystem. The attack complexity is usually irrelevant to the degree
of polynomials which also contrasts to the other algebraic attacks proposed so far
(cf. [6]).
For m < n, the system does not naturally induce a univariate polynomial repre-
sentation so the connection to the univariate polynomial is lost. In order to regain
the connection of the system to the univariate representation, we simply assume that
MQ(2, n,m)-trapdoor is embedded into MQ(2, n, n)-trapdoor so that the solutions
found onMQ(2, n, n)-trapdoor are also the solutions for this embeddedMQ(2, n,m)-
trapdoor.
The structure of the dissertation is the following. In Chapter II, we prepare a
number of important well-known results from elementary number theory, finite fields,
polynomials, and characters. Subsequently, we provide the formal description of the
systems of multivariate quadratic polynomials on which our generic cryptosystem is
assumed to be constructed. We fix a MQ problem and assume that some arbitrary
MQ-trapdoor is readily designed. In Chapter III, the absolute values of Weil sum
of generic central polynomials are computed in p = 2 by a simple parity checking
algorithm. I.e., we introduce an explicit Weil sum evaluation algorithm of the central
polynomials which fully expresses the generic MQ problem. Since many Weil sum
7methods are about the bound results of the absolute values (cf. Theorem 5.38 [19]),
the algorithm obtained here is of independent interest for algorithmic number theory.
The results obtained in Chapter III appeared in Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2006/075 as ”On the Weil Sum Evaluation of Central Polynomial in Multivariate
Quadratic Cryptosystem” (by Tomohiro Harayama) [48].
In Chapter IV, we work on the number of solutions of some bivariate equation
associated with the Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial of form
∑D
i=1Aix
psi+1. Then we
relate this number of solutions to the Weil sum value of the polynomial while resolving
the sign of the Weil sum values. The fact that one can obtain the exact number of
the solutions of this bivariate equation will later turn out to be crucial for developing
the customization of the birthday attacks.
In Chapter V, we investigate the security of the MQ-trapdoor of the Dembowski-
Ostrom polynomials in Chapter IV. We introduce a new customization of the birth-
day attack against the Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials under some special conditions
in the generic MQ-trapdoor. We theoretically characterize the weak Dembowski-
Ostrom polynomials by the evaluation method of the exact number of solutions of
the bivariate equations in Chapter IV. It is shown that the new attack could be
asymptotically better than the attack based on the ordinary birthday problems for
infinitely many possible extension degrees n. The method proposed in this chapter
can be regarded as an equation solving algorithm for systems of multivariate quadratic
equations, and it is fundamentally different from Gro¨bner basis approaches.
Finally, we provide the empirical results from our experiments in Chapter VI
in order to confirm the existence of the weak Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials under
the linearized binomial attack in Chapter V. Although the list of the weak polyno-
mial instances is not exhaustive, we can naturally expect that there exist such weak
polynomials regardless of the size of the extension degree n of F2n . We also discuss
8the identified weak polynomials in comparison with HFE polynomials considered in
Gro¨bner basis approaches such as [6] and suggest some open questions that any MQ-
based short signature scheme must consider in their design principles. The results
obtained in Chapters IV, V and VI will appear in Journal of Mathematical Cryp-
tology as ”Weil Sum for Birthday Attack in Multivariate Quadratic Cryptosystem”
(by Tomohiro Harayama and Donald K. Friesen) [49]. The concluding remarks are
provided in Chapter VII.
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PRELIMINARIES
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce a number of the important well-known
results that are repeatedly used throughout this paper.
A. Elementary Number Theory
Let d = (α, e) denote the greatest common divisor gcd(α, e) of integers α and e.
Lemma 1 (cf. Lemma 2.6 [30]) For integers α and e, we have:
(2α, e) =
 d if e/d is odd,2d if e/d is even.
Proof Suppose e/d is odd. There is an integer m ∈ Z such that e = (2m+1)d. Also
for some α′ ∈ Z, α = α′d, thus we have 2α = 2α′d. Note that α′ and (2m + 1) are
relatively prime, so are 2α′ and (2m + 1), therefore (2α, e) = (2α′d, (2m + 1)d) = d.
Suppose e/d is even. There is an integer m ∈ Z such that e = 2md. While α′ and
2m are relatively prime, so are α′ and m, thus we have (2α′, 2m) = 2(α′,m) = 2.
Therefore, (2α, e) = (2α′d, 2md) = 2d(α′,m) = 2d and we obtain the desired results.
¤
Lemma 2 (Lemma 2 [18]. Lemma 4 [41]). For arbitrary positive integers α and e,
we have an identity:
(xα − 1, xe − 1) = x(α,e) − 1.
Proof Let {ri}i≥0 be the sequence of integers obtained by the Euclidean algorithm
from r0 = e and r1 = α. If k0 is the largest integer such that rk0 6= 0, then rk0 = (e, α).
Similarly, let {fi(x)}i≥0 be the sequence of the polynomials in Z[x] obtained by the
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Euclidean algorithm starting from f0 = x
e−1 and f1 = xα−1. If rk−1 = qk−1rk+rk+1
for each k with 1 ≤ k ≤ k0, we have:
xrk−1 − 1 = (xrk − 1)(xrk−1−rk + · · ·+ xrk−1−qk−1rk) + (xrk+1 − 1),
i.e., xrk+1 − 1 is a remainder of the division of xrk−1 − 1 by xrk − 1 since rk+1 < rk.
Therefore,
fk0+1(x) = x
rk0+1 − 1 = x0 − 1 = 0 and fk0(x) = xrk0 − 1 6= 0,
so fk0(x) is the greatest common divisor (f0(x), f1(x)). Hence,
(xe − 1, xα − 1) = (f0(x), f1(x)) = fk0(x) = (x(e,α) − 1),
which is the desired result. ¤
Lemma 3 (Greatest Common Divisors. Lemma 2.1 [32] and Lemma 2.6 [30]). For
arbitrary positive integers α, e and d = (α, e), we have:
(2α + 1, 2e − 1) =
 1 if e/d is odd,2d + 1 if e/d is even.
In particular, we have (2α − 1, 2α + 1) = 1. When p is odd, we have:
(pα + 1, pe − 1) =
 2 if e/d is odd,pd + 1 if e/d is even.
Proof From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2,
(22α − 1, 2e − 1) = 2(2α,e) − 1 =
 2
d − 1 if e/d is odd,
22d − 1 if e/d is even.
Assuming the greatest common divisor of two odd integers (2α + 1, 2α − 1) ≥ 3 leads
to a contradiction as (2α + 1) − (2α − 1) = 2 < 3. So we have (2α + 1, 2α − 1) = 1
11
and (2α + 1, 2d − 1) = 1. Now,
(22α − 1, 2e − 1) = (2α − 1, 2e − 1)(2α + 1, 2
e − 1
(2α − 1, 2e − 1))
= (2d − 1)(2α + 1, 2
e − 1
2d − 1)
= (2d − 1)(2α + 1, 2e − 1),
which yields the first part of this lemma. For the case p is odd, similarly from Lemma 1
and Lemma 2,
(p2α − 1, pe − 1) = p(2α,e) − 1 =
 p
d − 1 if e/d is odd,
p2d − 1 if e/d is even.
Therefore, we have:
(p2α − 1, pe − 1) = (pα − 1, pe − 1)(pα + 1, p
e − 1
(pα − 1, pe − 1))
= (pd − 1)(pα + 1, p
e − 1
pd − 1)
Assuming the greatest common divisor of two even integers (pα + 1, pα − 1) ≥ 4
leads to a contradiction as (pα + 1) − (pα − 1) = 2 < 4, so (pα + 1, pα − 1) = 2.
Since pd − 1 (< pα − 1) is also even, we have (pα + 1, pd − 1) = 2. Recall also that
(pe − 1)/(pd − 1) = p(e/d−1)d + p(e/d−2)d + · · ·+ pd + 1. Thus,
(p2α − 1, pe − 1) =

pd−1
2
(pα + 1, pe − 1) if e/d is odd,
(pd − 1)(pα + 1, pe − 1) if e/d is even.
¤
Lemma 4 (Linear Congruence Equation. cf. [50]). For arbitrary integers i, u, v and
positive integer n, the equation:
iu ≡ v mod n
12
is solvable for i ∈ Z if and only if (u, n) divides v. When the equation is solvable,
there are (u, n) distinct solutions.
Proof If the equation is solvable for i ∈ Z, then there exists some integer k ∈ Z
such that iu′(u, n) = kn′(u, n) + v with u = u′(u, n) and n = n′(u, n). So (u, n)
divides v. Conversely, assume that (u, n) divides v with v = v′(u, n). Then, we must
equivalently check the solvability of:
iu′ ≡ v′ mod n′.
Since u has the inverse (u′)−1 mod n′ for (u′, n′) = 1, we have:
i ≡ (u′)−1v′ mod n′,
so i is obtained. If this equation is solvable, for k ∈ Z with v = v′(u, n) we have
iu′ = kn′ + v′, i.e., iu′ ≡ v′ mod n′. For all integers l ∈ Z such that 0 ≤ l < n/n′,
i + ln′ also satisfies (i + ln′)u′ = iu′ + (lu′)n′ ≡ v′ mod n′. Thus, j = i + ln′ is also
a solution of i ≡ (u′)−1v′ mod n′. For the sufficiency condition, let j is an another
solution of i ≡ (u′)−1v′ mod n′. Then, we have i ≡ j mod n′. Thus for some k ∈ Z
j = i+ kn′ and we obtained the desired results. ¤
Finally, we recall the notion of birthday problem (Facts. 2.26, 2.27 [2]) which is
crucial for the cryptanalysis in Chapter 5.
Definition 5 (Stirling Number of the Second Kind. Definition 2.25 [2]). For non-
negative integers m,n with m ≥ n, the number m(n) is defined as m(n) = m(m −
1)(m − 2) · · · (m − n + 1). The Stirling number of the second kind, denoted {m
n
}
is
defined as
{
0
0
}
= 1 for m = n = 0, and
{m
n
}
=
1
n!
n∑
k=0
(−1)n−k
(
m
n
)
km,
13
for nonnegative integers m,n with m ≥ n.
The symbol
{
m
n
}
counts the number of ways of partitioning a set of m objects
into n nonempty subsets.
Lemma 6 (Classical Occupancy Problem Fact. 2.36. [2]). An urn has m balls num-
bered 1 to m. Suppose that n balls are drawn from the urn one at a time, with
replacement, and their numbers are listed. The probability that exactly t different
balls have been drawn is:
P1(m,n, t) =
{m
n
} m(t)
mn
,
for 1 ≤ t ≤ n.
Proof Let us denote the set of n picked balls {i1, i2, . . . , in} in order. There are
{
n
t
}
possible ways to partition of n balls into t nonempty subsets. There are m(t) possible
choices of t distinctive numbers of balls out of m numbers. Thus, we have in total
m(t)×{n
t
}
possible ways to have exactly t different balls among n balls {i1, i2, . . . , in}
drawn from the urn of m balls one at a time, with replacement meanwhile there are
mn possible ways to pick up n balls out of m balls with replacement. Therefore, we
obtain the desired result:
P1(m,n, t) = m
(t)
{m
n
}
× 1
mn
.
¤
Definition 7 (Birthday Problem. Fact 2.27. [2]) An urn has q balls numbered 1 to
q. Suppose that r balls are drawn from the urn one at a time, with replacement, and
their numbers are listed. Then, the probability of at least one coincidence (i.e., a ball
drawn at least twice) is:
P2(q, r) = 1− P1(q, r, r) = 1− q
(r)
qr
,
14
for 1 ≤ r ≤ q. If r = O(√q), then we have:
P2(q, r)→ 1− exp(−r(r − 1)
2q
+O(
1√
q
)) ≈ 1− exp(− r
2
2q
).
The probability distribution defined by P2(q, r) is called a birthday surprise or paradox.
It is well known that the probability that at least 2 people in a room of 23 people
have the same birthday is P2(365, 23) ≈ 0.507, which is surprisingly large. For a fixed
q, the quantity of P2(q, r) rapidly increases as r increases. In Chapter 5, we use the
fact that the expected number of draws before a coincidence is
√
pi
2
q as q →∞.
B. Finite Fields
Let p be a prime. Then the Galois field Fp is usually identified with Z/(p) the ring
of residue classes of the integers modulo a principal ideal generated by p. From the
theorem of Existence and Uniqueness of Finite Fields (Theorem 2.5 [19]), any finite
field has some prime power order q = pn and conversely for any prime p and n ≥ 1,
there exists a finite field of order q = pn uniquely determined up to field isomorphisms.
We denote the finite extension field of Fp of degree n by Fq. The extension field Fq is
often regarded as a vector space F np over Fp of dimension n with some basis. Since we
identify Fp with Z/(p), the image of absolute trace function of any x ∈ Fq are merely
the integers in [0, p− 1].
Let Fq be a finite field. Then the set of all nonzero elements of Fq forms a cyclic
group in terms of the multiplication operation of Fq. Denote the group by F
∗
q . It is
easily shown that for any a ∈ Fq, aq = a.
Theorem 8 (Power of p. Theorem 1.46. [19]). Let Fq be a finite field of character-
istic p. For any integer t ∈ Z and x, y ∈ Fq:
1. (x+ y)p
t
= xp
t
+ yp
t
and
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2. (x− y)pt = xpt − ypt .
Proof From (
p
i
)
=
p(p− 1) · · · (p− 1 + 1)
1 · 2 · · · i ≡ 0 mod p,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ p− 1, we have:
(x+ y)p = xp +
p−1∑
i=1
(
p
i
)
xiyp−i + yp = xp + yp,
as the fact that ring Fq is of characteristic p turns all the intermediate terms
(
p
i
)
xiyp−i
of nonzero coefficients into zeros. Thus, the induction on t yields the first identity.
The second identity follows from the first one, i.e.,
xp
t
= ((x− y) + y)pt = (x− y)pt + ypt .
¤
Definition 9 (Primitive Element. Definition 2.9. [19]). Let Fq be a finite fields. A
generator of the cyclic group F ∗q of Fq is called a primitive element of Fq.
It is well known that the primitive elements exist in any finite field Fq and serves
as a defining element over Fp.
Definition 10 (Conjugate Element. Definition 2.18. [19]). Let Fq be a finite field,
which is an extension of Fp where q = p
n. For a ∈ Fq, the elements ap, ap2 , . . . , apn−1
are called the conjugates of a with respect to Fq.
By automorphisms σ of Fq we mean an automorphism of Fq that fixes the elements
of Fp. For 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1:
σi(a) = a
pi ,
are also called Frobenius mappings (cf. Theorem 2.21. [19]). For any Frobenius
mapping σi(a) = a
pi we often use the fact that σi(a) runs throughout Fq as a runs
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throughout Fq in the various passages of the proofs of Weil sum methods in the later
chapters.
The theory of polynomials over finite fields is the main mathematical knowledge
necessary for designing and analyzing the currently proposed multivariate quadratic
cryptosystems. The following polynomial called linearized polynomial has very im-
portant features in our cryptosystems.
Definition 11 (Linearized Polynomial. Definition 3.49. [19]) A polynomial of the
form:
L(x) =
m−1∑
i=0
bix
qi ,
with coefficients in an extension field Fqm is called a q-polynomial over Fqm.
When the value of q is fixed once and for all or is clear from the context, it is called
a linearized polynomial. In this paper, we only consider a linearized polynomial as
p-polynomial over Fq. As is easily shown, we have:
L(x+ y) = L(x) + L(y) and L(ax) = aL(x),
for all a ∈ Fq and x ∈ Fqm . Thus, a linearized polynomial is considered a linear
mapping over Fqm when we regard Fqm as as Fq-vector space. Suppose we only
consider a p-polynomial over Fq by regarding Fq as a vector space F
n
p of dimension
n over Fp. If we set the corresponding n × n matrix BL over Fp to this L, it is easy
to solve the equation y = L(x) by applying the Gaussian Elimination on the matrix
BL. In other words, we can easily obtain the inverse B
−1
L which corresponds to the
inverse linearized polynomial L−1(x) over Fq if L(x) is bijective.
A trace function Trt : Fq → Fpt for some integer t ≥ 1 which divides n, is defined
by
Trt(x) = x+ x
pt + xp
2t
+ . . .+ xp
(n/t−1)t
,
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for all x ∈ Fq and the absolute trace function is simply denoted by Tr (when t = 1).
Theorem 12 (Properties of Trace. Theorem 2.23. [19]). Let q = pn and t ∈ Z a
positive integer. For all x, y ∈ Fq and a ∈ Fpt, we have:
1. Trt(ax) = aTrt(x),
2. Trt(x+ y) = Trt(x) + Trt(y) and
3. Trt(x
pt) = Trt(x).
Proof Since ap
t
= a for all a ∈ Fpt , we have:
Trt(ax) = (ax) + (ax)
pt + · · ·+ (ax)p(n/t−1)t
= ax+ axp
t
+ · · ·+ axp(n/t−1)t
= aTrt(x).
By using Theorem 8, we have:
Trt(x+ y) = (x+ y) + (x+ y)
pt + · · ·+ (x+ y)p(n/t−1)t
= x+ y + xp
t
+ yp
t
+ · · ·+ yp(n/t−1)t + xp(n/t−1)t
= Trt(x) + Trt(y).
Therefore we have:
Trt(x
pt) = (xp
t
) + (xp
t
)p
t
+ · · ·+ (xpt)p(n/t−1)t
= (xp
t
) + (xp
t
)p
t
+ · · ·+ (xpt)pn
= Trt(x).
¤
A additive character χ of the additive group of Fq is a homomorphism from Fq
to the multiplicative group U of complex numbers of absolute value 1. That is, χ is
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a mapping from Fq to U with χ(x1 + x2) = χ(x1)χ(x2) for all x1, x2 ∈ Fq (Section 1
[19]). The character is called canonical additive character if χ1(x) = exp(2piiTr(x)/p)
for x ∈ Fq. From Theorem 5.7 [19], any additive character χa of Fq is obtained from
χa(x) = χ1(ax),
for all x ∈ Fq with some a ∈ Fq. The following properties will turn out to be very
useful in the later chapters.
Theorem 13 (Properties of Additive Character. Chapter 5. [19]). For all x, y ∈ Fq,
we have:
1. χ1(x+ y) = χ1(x)χ1(y) and
2. χ1(x
p) = χ1(x).
Proof From Theorem 12 we have Tr(x+ y) = Tr(x) + Tr(y). Thus,
exp(2piiTr(x+ y)/p) = exp(2piiTr(x)/p) exp(2piiTr(y)/p).
Similarly, since Tr(xp) = Tr(x), we also have
exp(2piiTr(xp)/p) = exp(2piiTr(x)/p),
and we obtained the desired results. ¤
Let F∧q denote the set of all additive characters of Fq.
Theorem 14 (Properties of Character Sum. Theorem 5.4. [19]). For any nontrivial
additive character χ ∈ F∧q , we have:∑
x∈Fq
χ(x) = 0.
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Also for any x 6= 0 ∈ Fq we have:
∑
χ∈F∧q
χ(x) = 0.
Proof Since χ is nontrivial, there exists a 6= 0 ∈ Fq such that χ(a) 6= 1. Thus,
χ(a)
∑
x∈Fq
χ(x) =
∑
x∈Fq
χ(a+ x) =
∑
a+x∈Fq
χ(a+ x) =
∑
x∈Fq
χ(x).
Therefore, we have:
(χ(a)− 1)
∑
x∈Fq
χ(x) = 0,
which implies the first part of the theorem. For the second part, we denote the
function â defined as:
â(χ) = χ(a),
for all χ ∈ F∧q and a ∈ Fq It is an easy matter to show that F∧q forms an abelian
group with addition defined as:
(χa + χb)(x) = χa(x)χb(x)
for χa, χb: additive characters and x ∈ Fq with the trivial additive character χ0 as
the identity element. Therefore we have:
∑
χ∈F∧q
χ(a) =
∑
χ∈F∧q
â(χ) = 0.
¤
Now, we are ready for introducing a Weil sum of polynomials over finite fields.
Definition 15 (Weil Sum. Chapter 4. [19]). Let χ be a nontrivial additive character
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of Fq and let a polynomial f(x) ∈ Fq[x] be of positive degree. Then, the sum:
∑
x∈Fq
χ(f(x)),
is called a Weil sum of f(x).
As a final preparation of finite fields, we recall a result regarding the solvability
of equations over Fq.
Corollary 16 (Solvability. Theorem 3.1. [32]). Let g be a primitive element of Fq.
Let α be an integer and a = gs be a nonzero element of Fq with some integer s. Then,
the finite field equation:
xα = a,
is solvable for x ∈ Fq if and only if (α, q − 1) divides s.
Proof Expressing x ∈ Fq of the equation by the conjugate of primitive element g as
x = gr for some (unknown) integer s, we want to know the solvability of the equation:
grα = gs,
for r ∈ Z. Equivalently, we need to know the solvability of the associated linear
congruence equation in the exponents:
rα ≡ s mod q − 1,
for r ∈ Z. From Lemma 4, this equation is solvable if and only if (α, q− 1) divides s,
which is a desired result. ¤
21
C. Multivariate Quadratic Cryptosystems
Let q be some power of p. We fix two finite fields Fq and its extension Fqn . In general,
a function F : X → Z is called a oneway function if it is ”easy” to compute z = F (x)
for all x ∈ X but for essentially all elements z ∈ Im(F ), the image by F , it is
computationally infeasible (i.e., not in polynomial time) to find any x ∈ X such that
F (x) = z. It is well known that [2]:
Existence of oneway function ⇒ P 6= NP .
In order to build public key encryptions and digital signature schemes with any kind
of candidates of oneway functions, we need one more additional feature in the oneway-
ness of these functions.
Definition 17 (Trapdoor Oneway Function. Definition 1.16. [2]). A trapdoor oneway
function is a oneway function F : X → Z with the additional property that given some
extra information called trapdoor information it becomes feasible to find, for any given
z ∈ Im(F ), an x ∈ X such that F (x) = z.
Since it is still unknown if there exists a oneway function in a rigorous sense, it is also
unknown if there exists a trapdoor oneway function. However, there are a number of
good candidates for oneway and trapdoor oneway functions. We will introduce one
of the currently known candidates for a oneway function and for a trapdoor oneway
function in the following.
1. MQ Problem and Representations of Polynomials
Oneway functions and trapdoor oneway functions often called the cryptographic ref-
erence problems. This is because the security of many public-key cryptosystems relies
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on the apparent intractability of onewayness obtain from these functions. We now
consider one such cryptographic reference problem consisting of the systems of mul-
tivariate quadratic polynomials over finite fields.
Definition 18 (MQ Problem. cf. [25, 20]). Let P1, . . . , Pm ∈ Fq[x1, . . . , xn] be m
polynomials of n variables over Fq, each of which has form:
Pk(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
α
(k)
i,j xixj +
n∑
i=1
β
(k)
i xi + γ
(k),
whereby α
(k)
i,j , β
(k)
i , γ
(k) ∈ Fq for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, a MQ problem denoted by
MQ(q, n,m) is a problem of solving for indeterminates xi ∈ Fq of the random system
of m polynomial equations yk = Pk(x1, . . . , xn) for 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
Let φ be the standard linear bijection φ : Fqn → F nq (with some fixed basis of
Fqn over Fq). We introduce the important fact about this MQ problem.
Lemma 19 (Kipnis and Shamir, 1999. [38]). Let F = (P1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , Pn(x1, . . . ,
xn)) be a system of n multivariate polynomials of MQ Problem MQ(q, n, n) as is in
Definition 18. Then, there exists an unique univariate polynomial over Fqn:
f(x) =
D∑
i=1
aix
qαi+qβi +
L∑
j=1
bjx
qγj + c,
where D,L ∈ N , ai, bj, c ∈ Fqn , αi ≥ βi, qαi+qβi , qγj ≤ qn−1 for each 1 ≤ i ≤ D, 1 ≤
j ≤ L, such that:
φ ◦ f ◦ φ−1(v1, . . . , vn) = (P1(v1, . . . , vn), . . . , Pn(v1, . . . , vn)),
for ∀(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ F np .
Proof Let us fix a basis {ω1, . . . , ωn} of Fqn as a n-dimensional vector space F nq over
Fq. Without loss of generality we can take ω1 = 1 ∈ Fqn . Note that an arbitrary
23
linearized polynomial L(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 αix
qi over Fqn (Definition 11) represents a linear
mapping F nq → F nq which can be expressed by the associated n×n matrix BL. There
are (qn)n distinct linearized polynomials in Fqn [x] while there are q
n2 distinct n × n
matrices over Fq. Assuming that some pair of distinct linearized polynomials L1, L2
represents the same n × n matrix BL yields a contradiction because the difference
(L1 − L2)(x) is the polynomial of degree at most qn − 1 with qn zeros. Therefore,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between linearized polynomial in Fqn [x] and
n × n matrices over Fq. Now, let us construct a system of n multivariate quadratic
polynomials F = (P1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , Pn(x1, . . . , xn)) such that:
Pk(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
α
(k)
i,j xixj +
n∑
i=1
β
(k)
i xi + γ
(k)
i ,
for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n. In addition to the linearity of matrix BL, it is followed that each
multivariate quadratic polynomial Pk(x1, . . . , xn) can be constructed by the combi-
nation of the following rudimentary operations over F nq .
(x1, . . . , xn) 7→ (xi, 0, . . . , 0) This mapping is linear over F nq , thus we have a unique
linearized polynomial L(i) ∈ Fq[x] which represents this mapping.
(x1, . . . , xn) 7→ (xixj, 0, . . . , 0) This mapping is composed by multiplying the two as-
sociated linearized polynomials L(i)(x) and L(j)(x) for two mappings (x1, . . . , xn)
7→ (xi, 0, . . . , 0) and (x1, . . . , xn) 7→ (xj, 0, . . . , 0), respectively.
(xi, 0, . . . , 0) 7→ (0, . . . , xi, 0, . . . , 0) This mapping is built by multiplying ωi to the lin-
earized polynomial L(i) representing the mapping (x1, . . . , xn) 7→ (xi, 0, . . . , 0).
With these rudimentary procedures, we can generate a univariate polynomial in Fqn
which represents:
(x1, . . . , xn) 7→ (0, . . . , Pk(x1, . . . , xn), 0, . . . , 0)
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for each k of 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and we can sum up them into a single polynomial. As we
have the mapping:
(x1, . . . , xn) 7→ (xixj, 0, . . . , 0),
only the products of at most two linearized polynomials should appear in the final
outcome from these rudimentary operations. Therefore, we obtained the desired
result. ¤
From the constructive proof above the following is quite obvious.
Corollary 20 If F = (P1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , Pn(x1, . . . , xn)) a system of n multivari-
ate polynomials of total degree at most 2 over Fp is sparse, then the corresponding
univariate polynomial obtained from the procedures in Lemma 19 is also sparse.
Now, we will define the two types of polynomials which play crucial roles through-
out this paper.
Definition 21 (Central Polynomial). Given a system of n multivariate polynomials
(P1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , Pn(x1, . . . , xn)) of MQ problem MQ(q, n, n). A polynomial in
Fqn [x] of the form:
f(x) =
D∑
i=1
aix
qαi+qβi +
L∑
j=1
bjx
qγj + c, (2.1)
where D,L ∈ N , ai, bi, c ∈ Fqn , αi ≥ βi, qαi+qβi , qγj ≤ qn−1 for each 1 ≤ i ≤ D, 1 ≤
j ≤ L, is called a central polynomial of multivariate quadratic cryptosystem based on
MQ(q, n, n).
The term ”central” purely comes from a cryptographic reason for the design methods
of trapdoor structure commonly built in the concrete multivariate quadratic cryp-
tosystem, whereby the central polynomial of Definition 21 appears at the center of
the composition of 3 secret mappings over Fqn ∼= F nq . It should be emphasized that
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we also apply Kipnis and Shamir’s lemma Lemma 19 to express each mapping of
MQ(q, n, n) itself by this central polynomial.
When a central polynomial has no linearized and constant terms, the polynomial
has a special name in the following.
Definition 22 (Dembowski-Ostrom Polynomial. [30, 31, 32, 33]). A polynomial in
Fqn [x] of the form:
f(x) =
D∑
i=1
aix
qαi+qβi ,
where D ∈ N , ai ∈ Fqn , αi ≥ βi, qαi + qβi ≤ qn − 1 for each 1 ≤ i ≤ D, is called a
Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial.
This quadratic multinomial is the source of the computational hardness gained in the
MQ problem. We note that in the above definition a Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial
can be expressed by a product of two linearized polynomials (Definition 11) and from
Kipnis-Shamir’s Lemma 19 it corresponds to the homogeneous system over Fp.
2. Hidden Field Equation Cryptosystem
Let q be some power of a prime number. Hidden Field Equation System (HFE) uses
two finite fields Fq as a ground field and Fqn as an extension field. The following
trapdoor structure is designed in the MQ problem MQ(q, n, n) (Definition 18) of a
system of n multivariate quadratic polynomials in n indeterminates over Fq.
Definition 23 (HFE Trapdoor Oneway Function. [5]). Let Fq and Fqn be the finite
fields. A HFE trapdoor oneway function F : F np → F np , denote by HFE(q, n, n)-
trapdoor, is defined as a system of n multivariate quadratic polynomials F = (P1(x1, . . . ,
xn), . . . , Pn(x1, . . . , xn)) over Fq such that:
Pk(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
α
(k)
i,j xixj +
n∑
i=1
β
(k)
i xi + γ
(k)
i ,
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where α
(k)
i,j , β
(k)
i , γ
(k)
i ∈ Fq for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, such that F is composed by a secret
central polynomial f(x) in Fqn [x] (Definition 21) and two affine bijections L1 and L2
over vector space F np :
F = L1 ◦ φ ◦ f ◦ φ−1 ◦ L2.
The mapping F is a public key and the triple (L1, L2, f) is the private key (trapdoor
information).
In HFE(q, n, n)-trapdoor, the public-key computation is performed in such a
way that for a given vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) in F
n
q :
F : F nq 3 x = (x1, . . . , xn) 7−→ F (x) = (P1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , Pn(x1, . . . , xn)) ∈ F nq .
I.e., the public-key computation is a simple substitution of the value x = (x1, . . . , xn)
∈ F nq into the system of n multivariate quadratic polynomials F (x) = (P1(x), . . . ,
Pn(x)). Since all polynomial substitutions here are performed in the ground field Fq,
the computation is very simple and efficient.
The private-key computation is possible in the reverse order of the public-key
computation only with the knowledge of the private key (L1, L2, f) (i.e., trapdoor
information). More specifically, for an arbitrarily given vector z = (z1, . . . , zn) in F
n
q ,
we first apply the inverse affine mapping L−11 to z to obtain z
′ = (z′1, . . . , z
′
n) ∈ F nq :
L−11 : F
n
q 3 z = (z1, . . . , zn) 7−→ z′ = (L−11 (z1), . . . , L−1n (zn)) ∈ F nq .
Then we apply the inverse standard linear mapping φ−1 : F nq → Fqn to obtain the
corresponding z′′ = φ−1(z′1, . . . , z
′
n) ∈ Fqn :
φ−1 : F nq 3 z′ = (z′1, . . . , z′n) 7−→ z′′ ∈ Fqn .
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At the center of the private-key computation on the z′′ ∈ Fqn we need to solve
the central polynomial equation:
z′′ = f(x′′)
in order to obtain the solution x′′ ∈ Fqn . We note that when we perform this private-
key computation in HFE-trapdoor, it is always assumed that f(x′′) = z′′ has a solu-
tion. In other words, if HFE-trapdoor is used for encryption scheme, the private-key
computation is for the decryption of some readily encrypted message, thus, this step is
clearly solvable. If HFE-trapdoor is used for digital signature scheme, the private-key
computation is for signing of some (hashed message). In this case, some redundancy
bits are usually concatenated into the message bits so that we continue to perform
this central step by applying different redundancy bits until the equation z′′ = f(x′′)
is solvable. Since a central polynomial f(x) is not usually a permutation polynomial,
these redundancy bits are used in both encryption and decryption providing an error
correction effect so that it is always possible to pick up the unique right solution x′′
in this step.
Finally, we apply the standard linear mapping φ : Fqn → F nq to obtain the
corresponding x′ = (x′1, . . . , x
′
n) = φ(x
′′) ∈ F nq as:
φ : Fqn 3 x′′ 7−→ x′ = (x′1, . . . , x′n) ∈ F nq ,
and subsequently apply the inverse affine mapping L−12 to x
′ to obtain the final out-
come x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ F nq :
L−12 : F
n
q 3 x′ = (x′1, . . . , x′n) 7−→ (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ F nq .
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It should be reminded that the efficiency of central step
z′′ = f(x′′)
depends on the degree of f(x) in HFE-trapdoor structure [5]. Therefore, we usually
set some upper bound of the possible degree of the central polynomial equation z′′ =
f(x′′) in the key generation algorithm of the HFE system. The univariate polynomial
solving of Berlekamp algorithm is often applied to z′′ = f(x′′) to obtain the solution
x′′ in Fqn (cf. Chapter 4 [19]).
3. Enhanced TTS Multivariate Signature Scheme
Let q = pn with p prime. The Enhanced TTS Multivariate Signature Scheme (enTTS)
uses the ground finite field Fq. The following trapdoor structure is designed in the
MQ problem MQ(q, n,m) of a system of m multivariate quadratic polynomials in n
indeterminates over Fq.
Definition 24 (Enhanced TTS Trapdoor Oneway Function. [11]). Fix n = 28 and
m = 20. Let q be 27 = 256 and Fq = F256 a finite field. TTS trapdoor oneway function
F : F 28256 → F 20256, denote by enTTS(256, 28, 20)-trapdoor, is defined as a system of 20
multivariate quadratic polynomials F = (P8(x1, . . . , x28), . . . , P27(x1, . . . , x28)) over
F256 such that:
Pk(x0, . . . , x27) =
27∑
i=0
27∑
j=0
α
(k)
i,j xixj +
27∑
i=0
β
(k)
i xi + γ
(k)
i ,
where α
(k)
i,j , β
(k)
i , γ
(k)
i ∈ Fq for all 8 ≤ k ≤ 27, is a public key of the TTS cryptosystem
(Note: we use the index sets {0, . . . , n − 1} and {0, . . . ,m − 1}). F : F 28256 → F 20256 is
composed by a secret multivariate central polynomial f(x′) = (f8(x′0, . . . , x
′
27), . . . , f27
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(x′0, . . . , x
′
27)) of 28 variables over F256:
fi(x
′) = x′i +
7∑
j=1
ρ
(i)
j x
′
jx
′
8+(i+j mod 9), for 8 ≤ i ≤ 16,
f17(x
′) = x′17 + ρ
(17)
1 x
′
1x
′
6 + ρ
(17)
2 x
′
2x
′
5 + ρ
(17)
3 x
′
3x
′
4 + ρ
(17)
4 x
′
9x
′
16
+ ρ
(17)
5 x
′
10x
′
15 + ρ
(17)
6 x
′
11x
′
14 + ρ
(17)
7 x
′
12x
′
13,
f18(x
′) = x′18 + ρ
(18)
1 x
′
2x
′
7 + ρ
(18)
2 x
′
3x
′
6 + ρ
(18)
3 x
′
4x
′
5 + ρ
(18)
4 x
′
10x
′
17
+ ρ
(18)
5 x
′
11x
′
16 + ρ
(18)
6 x
′
12x
′
15 + ρ
(18)
7 x
′
13x
′
14,
fi(x
′) = x′i + ρ
(i)
0 x
′
i−11x
′
i−9 +
i−1∑
j=19
ρ
(i)
j−18x
′
2(i−j)−(i mod 2)x
′
j
+ ρ
(i)
i−18x
′
0x
′
i +
27∑
j=i+1
ρ
(i)
j−18x
′
i−j+19x
′
j for 19 ≤ i ≤ 27,
whereby all the coefficients ρ
(i)
j are the elements in F256, and two affine bijections L1
over F 20256 and L2 over F
28
256 such that:
F = L1 ◦ f ◦ L2.
The mapping F is the public key and the triple (L1, L2, f = (f8, . . . , f27)) is the
private key (trapdoor information). (We note that this trapdoor is denoted by TTS5
or Enhanced TTS(20, 28) in the original paper (Section 11. [11].))
In enTTS(256, 28, 20)-trapdoor, the public-key computation is performed in such a
way that for a given vector x = (x0, . . . , x27) in F
28
q :
F : F 28256 3 x = (x0, . . . , x27) 7−→ (P8(x0, . . . , x27), . . . , P27(x0, . . . , x27)) ∈ F 20256.
I.e., the public-key computation is a simple substitution of the value x = (x0, . . . , x27)
into the system of 20 multivariate quadratic polynomials F (x) = (P8(x), . . . , P27(x)).
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The private-key computation is possible in the reverse order of the public-key
computation only with the knowledge of the private key (L1, L2, f = (f8, . . . , f27))
(i.e., trapdoor information). More specifically, for an arbitrarily given vector z =
(z8, . . . , z27) in F
28
q , we first apply the inverse affine mapping L
−1
1 to z to obtain
z′ = (z′8, . . . , z
′
27) ∈ F 20q :
L−11 : F
20
256 3 z = (z8, . . . , z27) 7−→ z′ = (L−11 (z), . . . , L−120 (z)) ∈ F 20256.
At the center of this private-key inversion, with the z′ = (z′8, . . . , z
′
27) ∈ F 20256 we
solve the central polynomial equation:
(z′8, . . . , z
′
27) = (f8(x
′
0, . . . , x
′
27), . . . , f27(x
′
0, . . . , x
′
27)),
in order to obtain the solution x′ = (x′0, . . . , x
′
27) ∈ F 28256.
First we assign 7 random elements in F256 to 7 variables x
′
1, . . . , x
′
7 in the system
f(x′) = (f8(x′), . . . f27(x′)). Observe that this substitution turns the system f(x′) into
a linear system f |(x′1,...,x′7) (x′8, . . . , x′27) of equations in 20 indeterminates x′8, . . . , x′16
in F256. Therefore, we can apply Gaussian Elimination in order to solve x
′
8, . . . , x
′
27
if possible. Otherwise we assign another 7 random elements in F256 to 7 variables
x′1, . . . , x
′
7 and repeat the process.
For x′17, x
′
18, we serially obtain their value by substituting the previous values of
x′’s into f18, f18 and solve them. Finally, a random value for x′0 is assigned and solve
the last systems for x′19, . . . , x
′
27. At most 9 possible values do not allow a solution for
x′19, . . . , x
′
27 ∈ F256. If we cannot solve at once, we repeat this random assignments.
Finally, we apply the inverse affine mapping L−12 to x
′ = (x′0, . . . , x
′
27) to obtain
the final outcome x = (x0, . . . , x27) ∈ F 28256:
L−12 : F
28
256 3 x′ = (x′0, . . . , x′27) 7−→ x = (x0, . . . , x27) ∈ F 28256.
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In contrast to HFE-trapdoor, the enTTS-trapdoor does not perform any arith-
metic operation in the extension fields of F256. Therefore, one may wonder if it is valid
to introduce the notions of univariate central polynomials and Dembowski-Ostrom
polynomials in this MQ problem. However, we introduce an appropriate generaliza-
tion of both HFE-trapdoor of two-field type and enTTS-trapdoor of one-field type
multivariate quadratic cryptosystems in the next subsection.
4. On the General Multivariate Quadratic Cryptosystem
In order to deal with the general MQ problem and its Weil sum application, we limit
the scope of the multivariate quadratic cryptosystems in this paper by taking the
following two assumptions.
1. We let p be a prime (2 or odd) and q = pn a n-th power of p. The two finite
fields Fp and its extension Fq are the primary mathematical structures for the
construction of our generic multivariate quadratic cryptosystem and the trap-
door structures in the system. As is often the case, the case p = 2 is important
for many practical systems.
2. When a given MQ problem MQ(p, n,m) has m < n with the system of F (x) =
(P1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , Pm(x1, . . . , xn)): m polynomials in n indeterminates over
Fp, the system F cannot induce a mapping F
n
p 7→ F np by itself so that the
connection with the univariate representation in Kipnis-Shamir’s Lemma 19 is
lost. Therefore, in order to recover this connection, we embed the original sys-
tem F = (P1, . . . , Pm) into the extended system F = (P1, . . . , Pm, Pm+1, . . . , Pn)
such that, for example:
Pm+1(x1, . . . , xn) = · · · = Pn(x1, . . . , xn) = 0.
32
In this way, we can consider the extended MQ problem MQ(p, n, n) whose
system has the corresponding univariate central polynomial by Lemma 19. It
is easy to see that any solution found for MQ(p, n, n) is also a solution of the
embedded MQ(p, n,m).
Our main goal in this paper is to identify and analyze some nontrivial classes of
the weak polynomial structures that exist in the generic multivariate quadratic cryp-
tosystem based on MQ problem MQ(p, n, n). We denote by MQ(p, n, n)-trapdoor an
arbitrary trapdoor structure designed into the public system F (x) = (P1(x1, . . . , xn),
. . . , Pn(x1, . . . , xn)): n multivariate quadratic polynomials in n indeterminates over
Fp whereby the equation z = F (x) for given z ∈ F np is secretly inverted with the
designed trapdoor information. Therefore, regardless of the concrete types of trap-
door expressed by MQ(p, n, n)-trapdoor, we can always work on the corresponding
univariate polynomial over the extension field Fq of form:
f(x) =
D∑
i=1
aix
pαi+pβi +
L∑
j=1
bjx
pγj + c,
which is identical to that of central polynomial in Definition 21 for the system
F = (P1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , Pn(x1, . . . , xn)) over Fp. Similarly, we may have Dembowski-
Ostrom polynomial:
f(x) =
D∑
i=1
aix
pαi+pβi ,
when each multivariate polynomial Pk of the system is a quadratic form (i.e. homo-
geneous quadratic polynomial).
For m < n, the system does not naturally induce the univariate polynomial rep-
resentation so the connection to the univariate polynomial is lost. In order to regain
the connection of the systems MQ(2, n,m)-trapdoor with m < n to the univari-
ate representations, we simply assume that MQ(2, n,m)-trapdoor is embedded into
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MQ(2, n, n)-trapdoor so that the solutions found on MQ(2, n, n)-trapdoor are also
the solutions for this embedded MQ(2, n,m)-trapdoor.
It should also be noted that the enTTS-trapdoor in Definition 24 has no Dembowski-
Ostrom polynomial in its key generation, and thus its trapdoor function is not homo-
geneous. And also the inversion of the multivariate central polynomial mappings:
f(x′) = (f8(x′1, . . . , x
′
n), . . . , f28(x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n))
over F256 are performed without using bigger finite field. In this case we apply the sec-
ond assumption to expand the system given by enTTS-trapdoor so that the extended
MQ problem can supersede the original system given by the enTTS-trapdoor.
In the key generation algorithm of the enTTS-trapdoor, there is no restriction
of upper bound to be set on the central polynomials. Therefore, in the following we
do not set the upper bound of central polynomials used in the generic MQ problems.
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CHAPTER III
WEIL SUM EVALUATION OF CENTRAL POLYNOMIALS
A. Introduction
Let Fq be a finite field of characteristic p (2 or any odd prime) and order q = p
n,
where n is the extension degree of Fq over Fp. In this chapter we fix a MQ prob-
lem MQ(p, n, n) (Definition 18) and assume that some generic trapdoor structure
MQ(p, n, n)-trapdoor is defined. We introduce the explicit Weil sum evaluation
schemes of the central polynomials that express the generic MQ problems.
In Section B we introduce a Weil sum of central polynomials in Definition 21 and
show that we can simplify the form of the central polynomials to facilitate Weil sum
evaluation. In Section C, we define a certain linearized polynomial for the simplified
central polynomials in the previous section. It is shown that this linearized polynomial
governs the computational efficiency as well as the final Weil sum value of the central
polynomial. Section D introduces a new Weil sum evaluation algorithm of the generic
central polynomials for the MQ problem. This algorithm is able to compute the
absolute value of the Weil sum of central polynomial in time empirically efficient
in terms of sparsity of the input central polynomial, the dimension of the auxiliary
linearized polynomial in Section C and the extension degree n.
B. Simplification of Central Polynomial
Let Fq be a finite field of characteristic p (2 or any odd prime) and order q = p
n. n is
the extension degree of Fq over Fp. Denote by S(a1, . . . , aD, b1, . . . , bL, c) (or simply
S) the Weil sum (Definition 15) of a central polynomial f(x) =
∑D
i=1 aix
pαi+pβi +∑L
j=1 bjx
pγj + c ∈ Fq[x] (Definition 21). Explicitly, with canonical additive character
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χ1 of Fq, we consider:
S = S(a1, . . . , aD, b1, . . . , bL, c) =
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
aix
pαi+pβi +
L∑
j=1
bjx
pγj + c).
Applying the property of additive character in Theorem 13 to the constant term c of
f(x) in the Weil sum S yields an equivalent Weil sum:
S = χ1(c){
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
aix
pαi+pβi +
L∑
j=1
bjx
pγj )}.
That is, one can separately treat the image of c by character χ1 when we evaluate the
Weil sum value S. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can always assume that the
constant term of central polynomials be zero (f(0) = c = 0) and may separately deal
with the value χ1(c) = χ1(f(0)) at the final step in Weil sum evaluation algorithm.
In the following we will show that we can also simplify the linearized terms∑L
j=1 bjx
pγj in the central polynomial f(x) =
∑D
i=1 aix
pαi+pβi +
∑L
j=1 bjx
pγj . The
newly introduced coefficients Ai ∈ Fq and parameters ti, yi, si ∈ Z and b ∈ Fq in
the following theorem will be later justified in the specification of the subsequent
Theorem 26 regarding the auxiliary linearized polynomial of central polynomials.
Theorem 25 (Simplification of Central Polynomials). Let f(x) be a central poly-
nomial over Fq of Definition 21 (with f(0) = 0). Assume that we set the new
coefficients Ai such that A
pti
i = ai ∈ Fq (1 ≤ i ≤ D) and parameters ti, yi, si ∈ Z,
and b ∈ Fq such that ti ≡ βi − β1 mod n (1 ≤ i ≤ D), and yi = n− si (2 ≤ i ≤ D),
si = αi − βi ≥ 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ D) and b =
∑L
j=1 b
pe−γj
j . Then, we can express the Weil
sum S = S(a1, . . . , aD, b1, . . . , bL) of f(x) as:
S =
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1 + bp
β1x).
We call the polynomial
∑D
i=1Aix
psi+1+bp
β1x the simplified central polynomial of f(x).
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Proof The proof of the simplification consists of two parts. First, we simplify the
linearized terms
∑L
j=1 bjx
pγj in central polynomial f(x) into a single linear term by
using Theorem 13. In the transformations below, we repeatedly apply Theorem 13
when splitting and joining the arguments of χ1 and taking the various powers of p
inside each argument. The first transformation is the following.
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
aix
pαi+pβi +
L∑
j=1
bjx
pγj ) =
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
aix
pαi+pβi )χ1(
L∑
j=1
bjx
pγj )
=
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
aix
pαi+pβi )
L∏
j=1
χ1(bjx
pγj )
=
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
aix
pαi+pβi )
L∏
j=1
χ1(b
pe−γj
j x
pe)
=
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
aix
pαi+pβi )
L∏
j=1
χ1(b
pe−γj
j x)
=
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
aix
pαi+pβi )χ1(
L∑
j=1
bp
e−γj
j x)
=
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
aix
pαi+pβi )χ1(bx)
=
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
aix
pαi+pβi + bx).
Therefore, the linearized terms
∑L
j=1 bjx
pγj of f(x) is turned into a single linear
term bx where b =
∑L
j=1 b
pe−γj
j and thus we have S = S(a1, . . . , aD, b1, . . . , bL) =
S(a1, . . . , aD, b).
Next, we replace the coefficients ai’s with the new coefficients Ai ∈ Fq under the
new integer parameters ti ≡ βi − β1 mod n (1 ≤ i ≤ D), yi = n − si (2 ≤ i ≤ D),
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si = αi − βi ≥ 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ D). We have:
S(a1, . . . , aD, b) =
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
aix
pαi+pβi + bx)
=
∑
x∈Fq
D∏
i=1
χ1(aix
pαi+pβi )χ1(bx)
=
∑
x∈Fq
D∏
i=1
χ1(aix
pβi (psi+1))χ1(bx)
=
∑
x∈Fq
D∏
i=1
χ1(A
pti
i (x
pβ1 )p
ti (psi+1))χ1(b
pβ1xp
β1 )
=
∑
u∈Fq
D∏
i=1
χ1((Aiu
psi+1)p
ti )χ1(b
pβ1u) [Note: u = xp
β1 ]
=
∑
u∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiu
psi+1 + bp
β1u).
Therefore, we obtain the simplification S(a1, . . . , aD, b) = S(A1, . . . , AD, b), i.e., the
equivalent Weil sum of the form:
S =
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1 + bp
β1x),
with the simplified central polynomial
∑D
i=1Aix
psi+1+bp
β1x. We obtained the desired
result. ¤
This theorem says that at the level of Weil sum values the Weil sum of generic central
polynomial is equal to that of special type of central polynomials of form:
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1 + bp
β1x.
This is the reason we name this type a simplified central polynomial.
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C. Weil Sum of Central Polynomials
It is shown in Theorem 25 the Weil sum of a central polynomial
∑D
i=1 aix
pαi+pβi +∑L
j=1 bjx
pγj (no constant term) over Fq is equivalent to that of the corresponding sim-
plified central polynomial of the form
∑D
i=1Aix
psi+1+ bp
β1x with specially introduced
new coefficients Ai ∈ Fq and parameters ti, yi, si ∈ Z and b ∈ Fq. In the following
theorem, we will justify their occurrences. We will deduce the auxiliary linearized
polynomial, denoted by TD(x) in Fq[x]. This linearized polynomial naturally appears
during the calculation in the proof, and afterward enables us to compute the concrete
absolute value of the Weil sum. As is common in the proof techniques of explicit
evaluation of Weil sum, we start with taking the product of the Weil sum and its
conjugate. Note that p can be either 2 or any odd prime.
Theorem 26 (Auxiliary Linearized Polynomials. cf. Theorem 1.4. [33]). Let f(x)
be a central polynomial over Fq of Definition 21 (with f(0) = 0), and let S be the
Weil sum of f(x). Then, the product |S|2 = SS is:
|S|2 = q
∑
TD(w)=0,w∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiw
psi+1 + bp
β1w),
whereby Ai’s are the new coefficients such that A
pti
i = ai (1 ≤ i ≤ D), and ti, yi, si
and b are the new parameters such that ti ≡ βi − β1 mod n (1 ≤ i ≤ D), yi = n− si
(2 ≤ i ≤ D), si = αi − βi ≥ 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ D) and b =
∑L
j=1 b
pe−γj
j . The index w of the
outer sum runs throughout the set of roots in Fq of a linearized polynomial defined as:
TD(w) = A
ps1
1 w
p2s1
+ A1w +
D∑
i=2
[Ap
s1
i w
ps1+si
+ (Aiw)
ps1+yi ].
Proof From Theorem 25 we can work on the simplified central polynomial
∑D
i=1Ai
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xp
si+1 + bp
s1x over Fq. That is, the Weil sum is expressed by:
S = S(A1, . . . , AD, b
pβ1 ) =
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1 + bp
β1x).
Now, let us take the product |S|2 = S(A1, . . . , AD, bpβ1 )S(A1, . . . , AD, bpβ1 ) . We
will show that the linearized polynomial TD(x) naturally appears during the course
of simplification of this product. As is in the transformation in Theorem 25, we
repeatedly apply Theorem 13 when splitting and joining the arguments of χ1 and
taking the various powers of p inside each argument. First we have:
|S|2 = SS
= {
∑
u∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiu
psi+1 + bp
β1u)} · {
∑
v∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
+Aiv
psi+1 + bp
β1v)}
= {
∑
u∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiu
psi+1 + bp
β1u)} · {
∑
v∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
−Aivpsi+1 − bpβ1v)}
=
∑
u,v∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Ai[u
psi+1 − vpsi+1] + bpβ1 (u− v))
=
∑
w,v∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Ai[(w + v)
psi+1 − vpsi+1] + bpβ1w)
=
∑
w,v∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Ai(w
psi+1 + wvp
si+1 + vwp
si+1) + bβ
s1w)
=
∑
w,v∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiw
psi+1 + bp
β1w) · χ1(
D∑
i=1
Ai(wv
psi + vwp
si )).
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We can further simplify the character Cw,v = χ1(
∑D
i=1Ai(wv
psi + vwp
si )) as
follows.
Cw,v = χ1(
D∑
i=1
Ai(wv
psi + vwp
si ))
= χ1(A1vw
ps1 + A1wv
ps1 +
D∑
i=2
Aivw
psi +
D∑
i=2
Aiwv
psi )
= χ1(A
ps1
1 v
ps1wp
2s1 + A1wv
ps1 +
D∑
i=2
Ap
s1
i v
ps1wp
si+s1 +
D∑
i=2
(Aiw)
ps1+yivp
s1 )
= χ1(v
ps1TD(w)).
Therefore, we have:
|S|2 =
∑
w∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiw
psi+1 + bp
β1w) ·
∑
v∈Fq
χ1(v
ps1TD(w)).
Recall that vp
s1 runs throughout Fq as v runs throughout Fq. Also by Theorem 14,
the inner sum
∑
v∈Fq χ1(v
ps1TD(w)) is zero unless Tn(w) = 0 for the index w ∈ Fq
of the outer sum, because otherwise vp
s1TD(w) also runs throughout Fq as v runs
throughout Fq. Therefore we have:
|S|2 = q
∑
TD(w)=0,w∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiw
psi+1 + bp
β1w),
which is the desired result. ¤
Finally, we will show a lemma regarding the set of roots of the auxiliary linearized
polynomial of the central polynomial.
Lemma 27 (Roots of Auxiliary Linearized Polynomial. Lemma 3.4 [33]). Let TD(x)
be an auxiliary linearized polynomial over Fq defined in Theorem 26. Suppose that
ε = gcd2≤i≤D(2s1, s1 + si, s1 + yi, n). Then, the set of roots of TD(x) forms a linear
subspace of Fq over Fpε and is isomorphic to Fptε for some integer t ∈ Z.
41
Proof For any monomial xp
α
in TD(x) = A
ps1
1 x
p2s1
+ A1x +
∑D
i=2[A
ps1
i x
ps1+si
+
(Aix)
ps1+yi ], the exponent α is divisible by the greatest common divisor ε. There-
fore for any u ∈ Fpε , upα = (((upε)pε) · · · )pε = u (α/ε times). Hence we have:
TD(ux) = A
ps1
1 (ux)
p2s1
+ A1ux+
D∑
i=2
[Ap
s1
i (ux)
ps1+si
+ (Aiux)
ps1+yi ]
= Ap
s1
1 ux
p2s1
+ A1ux+
D∑
i=2
[Ap
s1
i ux
ps1+si
+ u(Aix)
ps1+yi ]
= uTD(x),
for all u ∈ Fpε . That is, the set of roots of TD(x) is a linear subspace of Fq over Fpε .
By setting t ∈ Z the dimension of this subvector space over Fpε , the set of the roots
of TD(x) is F
t
pε ' Fptε and its cardinality is pεt. ¤
D. Weil Sum Algorithm for Central Polynomial
For finite fields of characteristic p = 2, the Weil sum with canonical additive character
is guaranteed to be real. It should be noted that this fact is quite different from those
in the cases when p is odd prime [33]. We have the following lemma for p = 2.
Lemma 28 (Character (p = 2)). Let Fq be of characteristic p = 2. Then, for any
u ∈ Fq, χ1(u) is real.
Proof It is a simple matter to show that from the definition of canonical additive
character, for any u ∈ Fq, we have:
χ1(u) = exp(
2pii
p
Tr(u)) = exp(piiTr(u)).
Since the image of u ∈ Fq by the absolute trace function Tr(u) = Tr1(u) is in
{0, 1} = F2, the value χ1(u) is either 1 or −1, which is real. ¤
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It follows by Lemma 28 that we also have:
Corollary 29 Let p = 2 and S the Weil sum of central polynomial f(x) as in Theo-
rem 26. Then, S is real and |S|2 = S2.
This corollary readily embraces the important idea for the efficient Weil sum
algorithm (for p = 2): for finite fields of p = 2, if we can compute the product of
the Weil sum S and its conjugate S as is in Theorem 26, then we can obtain the
absolute value of the Weil sum |S|. To see this more specifically, let f(x) be a central
polynomial
f(x) =
D∑
i=1
aix
pαi+pβi +
L∑
j=1
bjx
pγj ∈ Fq[x].
Theorem 25 says that we can express its Weil sum S = S(a1, . . . , aD, b1, . . . , bL) as
S =
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1 + bp
β1x),
where
∑D
i=1Aix
psi+1 + bp
β1x is the simplified central polynomial with coefficients
Ap
ti
i = ai (1 ≤ i ≤ D) and parameters ti ≡ βi − β1 mod n (1 ≤ i ≤ D), yi = n − si
(2 ≤ i ≤ D), si = αi − βi ≥ 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ D), and b =
∑L
j=1 b
pe−γj
j as usual. By the
theorem of auxiliary linearized polynomial (Theorem 26), the product |S|2 = SS is
expressed by:
|S|2 = q
∑
TD(w)=0,w∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiw
psi+1 + bp
β1w),
where TD(w) = A
ps1
1 w
p2s1
+ A1w +
∑D
i=2[A
ps1
i w
ps1+si
+ (Aiw)
ps1+yi ] is the auxiliary
linearized polynomial in Fq[x], and also Corollary 29 yields
S = ±
√
S2 = ±
√
|S|2.
Now, let us consider some basis {ω1, . . . , ωn} of Fq as a vector space Fq ∼= F np .
Then, TD is actually a linear mapping over F
n
p by the same reason in Lemma 27.
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More specifically, we have:
TD(ux) = uTD(x),
for all u ∈ Fp and x ∈ Fq. (Obviously, the exponent p0 = 1 of u = up0 divides
the exponents of any monomial appearing in TD(x).) Let us take an n × n matrix
B = (bik), 1 ≤ i, k ≤ n over Fp that represents the corresponding mapping TD over
Fq. In other words, we have for each ωi in {ω1, . . . , ωn},
TD(ωi) =
n∑
k=1
bikωk,
bik ∈ Fp and equivalently:
y1ω1 + · · ·+ ynωn = TD(x1ω1 + · · ·+ xnωn)⇐⇒ (y1, . . . , yn) = (x1, . . . , xn)B,
for (x1, . . . , xn), (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ F np .
In order to actually compute the partial sum in the product |S|2, we need some
representation of the set of the roots of the equation TD(x) = 0. Suppose r = rank(B)
is the rank of the matrix B. Then, there are pn−r roots of TD(w) = 0 in Fq (note that
w = 0 is always a root). So let l = n−r and assume that some basis {η1, . . . , ηl} ⊂ Fq
forms the set of the roots of TD(w) = 0 which is a subvector space of F
n
p . Then, from
the properties of linearity and powers of p of trace function in Theorem 12, we have
for any η =
∑
i=1 xiηi ∈ ker(TD) with each xi ∈ Fp:
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Tr(
D∑
i=1
Aiη
psi+1 + bp
β1η) = Tr(
D∑
i=1
Ai(
l∑
j=1
xjηj)
psi+1 + bp
β1 (
l∑
j=1
xjηj))
= Tr(
D∑
i=1
Ai(
l∑
j1=1
xj1ηj1) · (
l∑
j2=1
xj2ηj2)
psi + bp
β1 (
l∑
j=1
xjηj))
= Tr(
D∑
i=1
Ai(
l∑
j1=1
xj1ηj1) · (
l∑
j2=1
xp
si
j2
ηp
si
j2
) + bp
β1 (
l∑
j=1
xjηj))
=
D∑
i=1
l∑
j1=1
l∑
j2=1
Tr(Aixj1x
psi
j2
ηj1η
psi
j2
) +
l∑
j=1
Tr(bp
β1xjηj)
=
D∑
i=1
l∑
j1=1
l∑
j2=1
xj1x
psi
j2
Tr(Aiηj1η
psi
j2
) +
l∑
j=1
xjTr(b
pβ1ηj)
=
D∑
i=1
l∑
j1=1
l∑
j2=1
xj1xj2Tr(Aiηj1η
psi
j2
) +
l∑
j=1
xjTr(b
pβ1ηj).
Therefore, we have:
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiη
psi+1+bp
β1η) = exp(
2pii
p
(
D∑
i=1
l∑
j1=1
l∑
j2=1
xj1xj2Tr(Aiηj1η
psi
j2
)+
l∑
j=1
xjTr(b
pβ1ηj))).
Henceforth, let us consider the case p = 2. Now we have:
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiη
2si+1+b2
β1η) = exp(pii(
D∑
i=1
l∑
j1=1
l∑
j2=1
xj1xj2Tr(Aiηj1η
2si
j2
)+
l∑
j=1
xjTr(b
2β1ηj))).
By pre-computing the trace values: γi,j1,j2 = Tr(Aiηj1η
2si
j2
),
ρj = Tr(b
2β1ηj),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ D, 1 ≤ j1, j2 ≤ l, we can evaluate the parity C(x1,...,xl):
C(x1,...,xl) =
D∑
i=1
l∑
j1=1
l∑
j2=1
xj1xj2γi,j1,j2 +
l∑
j=1
xjρj ∈ F2 = {0, 1}
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for each (x1, . . . , xl) ∈ F l2. Therefore, for the image of χ1 on the argument with
η ∈ ker(TD), we have either:
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiη
2si+1 + b2
β1η) = exp(piiC(x1,...,xl)) = 1,
if C(x1,...,xl) = 0, or:
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiη
2si+1 + b2
β1η) = exp(piiC(x1,...,xl)) = −1,
if C(x1,...,xl) = 1. We can combine these two cases as:
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiη
2si+1 + b2
β1η) = exp(piiC(x1,...,xl)) = 1− 2C(x1,...,xl),
for each root η =
∑l
i=1 xiηi ∈ ker(TD). As a result, we obtain:
|S|2 = |S(A1, . . . , AD, b2β1 )|2
= 2n
∑
TD(w)=0,w∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiw
2si+1 + b2
β1w)
= 2n
∑
(x1,...,xl)∈F l2,η=
Pl
i=1 xiηi
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiη
2si+1 + b2
β1η)
= 2n
∑
(x1,...,xl)∈F l2
(1− 2C(x1,...,xl))
= 2n(2l − 2
∑
(x1,...,xl)∈F l2
C(x1,...,xl)).
Note that since p = 2, the simple parity check of the value C(x1,...,xl) is sufficient
for obtaining the value χ1(
∑D
i=1Aiη
2si+1 + b2
β1η) = exp(piiC(x1,...,xl)), rather than
performing complex number calculation with exp(2pi
p
iT rp(X)) as for the case where p
odd prime. We can formulate the above Weil sum algorithm in the following.
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Algorithm 30 (Weil Sum Algorithm (p = 2)). Assume that a basis {ω1, . . . , ωn} of
F2n ∼= F n2 is available before computation.
INPUT f(x) =
∑D
i=1 aix
2αi+2βi +
∑L
i bix
2γi : a central polynomial in F2n [x].
OUTPUT |S|: the absolute value of Weil sum S of f(x).
1. Compute the associated auxiliary linearized polynomial TD(x) ∈ F2n [x] as in
Theorem 26 (Suppose the rank of the kernel is l).
2. Compute the basis {η1, . . . , ηl} of ker(TD).
3. Let U be 0 ∈ Z.
4. Compute γi,j1,j2 = Tr(Aiηj1η
2si
j2
) for 1 ≤ i ≤ D, 1 ≤ j1, j2 ≤ l
5. Compute ρj = Tr(b
2β1ηj) for 1 ≤ j ≤ l.
6. For each (x1, . . . , xl) ∈ F l2, evaluate:
C(x1,...,xl) =
D∑
i=1
l∑
j1=1
l∑
j2=1
xj1xj2γi,j1,j2 +
l∑
j=1
xjρj ∈ F2
and set U = U + C(x1,...,xl). (Note: integer addition.)
7. Return 2n/2
√
2l − 2U .
Theorem 31 (Validity and Complexity). The Weil sum algorithm in Algorithm 30
computes the absolute value |S| of Weil sum S of the input central polynomial f(x) =∑D
i=1 aix
2αi+2βi +
∑L
i bix
2γi in F2n [x] in time:
O(CDLl
2(n3 + 2l)),
where l is the dimension of the kernel of the auxiliary linearized polynomial TD(x)
and CDL = D + L is the sparsity of f(x).
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Proof Suppose that the basic arithmetic operations for the elements in Fq costs
O(log2 q) time in RAM. When q = 2n, it takes O(n2) time. The estimate of each step
of the algorithm is:
1. Ai is obtained from 2
n−ti-th power of ai, thus in O(CDLn3) time.
2. Performing Gaussian Elimination on B to obtain the basis {η1, . . . , ηl} takes
O(n3) time.
3. O(1) time.
4. Trace Tr(x) = x+ x2 + · · ·+ x2n−1 has n− 1 additions and n− 1 squarings in
F2n in O(n
3) time. Thus, we have Dl2 ×O(n3) = O(Dl2n3) time.
5. l ×O(n3) = O(ln3) time.
6. 3×Dl2 + 1× l + 1 ops in F2. So O(2lDl2) time.
Therefore we have:
O(CDLl
2(n3 + 2l))
time. The input size (number of bits required to represent f) is about CDLn log p =
CDLn log 2 and clearly the complexity does not depend on the degree of f(x) while it
primarily depends on the dimension l of the kernel of TD(x) and the extension degree
n of F2n . ¤
Note that Algorithm 30 does not resolve the sign of the Weil sum S since the
returned value is the absolute value |S|. We will provide the resolution techniques
of the sign of the Weil sum in the next chapter. As is stated in the beginning of
this chapter, if central polynomial has a nonzero constant term, we can separately
calculate the character value of the constant and multiply by it the result obtained
from the Algorithm 30.
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In practice, the dimension l of the kernel of the matrix B of TD(x) is usually
small and the experiments in Chapter 6 imply that the parity checking step (6) in
Algorithm 30 is very feasible for larger n of our cryptographic interests.
E. Concluding Remarks
The proof method in the simplification procedures of Theorem 25 in Section B is a
natural extension of the combined results of Theorem 1.4. [33] and [31]. We showed
that at the level of Weil sum values, we can work on the simplified form of central
polynomials, in stead of dealing each coefficients appearing in the linearized terms of
the central polynomials. The auxiliary linearized polynomial in Section C turns into
the index set of partial Weil sum in Algorithm 30 whereby the dimension of its kernel
dominates the time complexity of the algorithm.
In fact, it will be shown in Chapter VI that many of the auxiliary linearized
polynomials have their kernels of dimensions much smaller than the extension degree
n. We do not claim that this algorithm is optimal. It remains an open question to
improve the efficiency of this algorithm. The sign that the Algorithm 30 could not
resolve will be handled under a certain conditions on the polynomials in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
THE NUMBER OF SOLUTIONS OF A BIVARIATE EQUATION FOR
DEMBOWSKI-OSTROM POLYNOMIALS
A. Introduction
We will work on the Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial of the form:
∑D
i=1Aix
psi+1 over
Fq in Theorem 25. It is easily shown from Theorem 25 that for any Dembowski-
Ostrom polynomial over Fq, there exists a simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial
of this form whose Weil sum is equivalent to that of the original Dembowski-Ostrom
polynomial.
In Section B, we introduce a bivariate polynomial equation associated this sim-
plified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial. As is in parallel to the standard application
of character theory (Chapter 6. [19]), we examine the number of solutions of this
bivariate equation. In Section C, we introduce a relation between the number of the
solutions and the Weil sum value of the simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials
under a certain condition. The actual computation of the number of solutions is per-
formed in Section D by resolving the sign of the Weil sum which the previous Weil
sum Algorithm 30 in Chapter III could not resolve for the generic central polynomials.
B. The Bivariate Equation for Dembowski-Ostrom Polynomials
Let q = pn be the order of Fq when p is either 2 or an odd prime. Consider an
arbitrary Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial f(x) ∈ Fq[x] of form:
f(x) =
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1,
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where Ai ∈ Fq. This is a simplified central polynomial with b = 0 in Theorem 25.
So we can call this f(x) a simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial. We denote the
greatest common divisor of s1, . . . , sD and n by:
δ = gcd(s1, . . . , sD, n) = (s1, . . . , sD, n).
We now introduce a special type of bivariate polynomial equations that is as-
sociated with the simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials. More specifically, we
consider the bivariate polynomial equation over Fq × Fq:
f(x) = yp
δ − y,
whereby the left-hand side is the simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial in Fq[x]
while the right-hand side is a linearized binomial yp
δ − y ∈ Fq[y]. We denote the
bivariate polynomial by g(x, y) ∈ Fq[x, y]:
g(x, y) = f(x)− ypδ + y =
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1 − ypδ + y.
Henceforth, we are interested in the number of solutions of the bivariate polynomial
equation g(x, y) = 0 in Fq × Fq which we denote by:
N = N(g(x, y)) = ]{(x, y) ∈ Fq × Fq | g(x, y) = 0}.
From a simple observation of this bivariate equation, we can easily obtain an
estimate of the value of N(g(x, y)) under a certain condition. To see this, recall that
for integers r, s where s divides r we have:
xr + 1 = (xs + 1)(x(r/s−1)s − x(r/s−2)s + . . .− xs + 1),
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if r/s is odd; and
xr − 1 = (xs + 1)(x(r/s−1)s − x(r/s−2)s + . . .+ xs − 1),
if r/s is even. We can obtain the following lemma for the congruential estimate on
N.
Lemma 32 (Batched Solutions. cf. [33]). Let f(x) be a simplified Dembowski-
Ostrom polynomial
∑D
i=1Aix
psi+1 over Fq with each si/δ being an odd number and
g(x, y) = f(x) − ypδ + y the bivariate polynomial. Then, the number of solutions
N(g(x, y)) of the bivariate equation g(x, y) = 0 is estimated as:
N ≡ −1 mod pδ + 1.
Proof Note that δ = (s1, . . . , sD, n) by definition and p
si + 1 is divisible by pδ + 1
since we have
psi + 1 = (pδ + 1)(p(si/δ−1)δ − p(si/δ−2)δ + · · · − pδ + 1),
for each odd integer si/δ. If (x, y) ∈ Fq × Fq is a solution of the equation:
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1 = yp
δ − y,
over Fq × Fq with nonzero x 6= 0, then (wx, y) is also a solution if wpδ+1 = 1. Hence
the solutions (x, y) ∈ Fq × Fq of the equation for each nonzero x are in some batch
{(wx, y) | wpδ+1 = 1} of size pδ + 1. In addition, there are pδ solutions (0, y) as
linearized binomial yp
δ − y = 0 is satisfied by any y in Fpδ . Therefore, denoting the
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number of solutions of nonzero x by integer t ∈ Z, we have:
N = (pδ + 1)t+ pδ
≡ pδ mod pδ + 1
≡ −1 mod pδ + 1,
which is the desired result. ¤
C. The Number of Solutions and Weil Sum
Assume that f(x) is a simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial
∑D
i=1Aix
psi+1 over
Fq and S = S(A1, . . . , AD) the Weil sum. Denote N = N(g(x, y)) the number of
solutions of bivariate polynomial equation g(x, y) = f(x) − ypδ + y = 0 in Fq × Fq.
Then, we want to discover a certain relation between the Weil sum value S and the
number of solutions N . For this purpose, first we need to express N by using the
canonical additive character χ1. Applying the standard application of character sum
(cf. Theorem 14) to the bivariate polynomial: g(x, y) =
∑D
i=1Aix
psi+1 − ypδ + y, we
have
N =
1
q
∑
w∈Fq
∑
x,y∈Fq
χ1(wg(x, y))
=
1
q
∑
w∈Fq
∑
x,y∈Fq
χ1(w(
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1 − ypδ + y)).
53
Theorem 13 can also work here to get:
χ1(w(
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1 − ypδ + y)) = χ1(w
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1)
∑
y∈Fq
χ1(w(y − ypδ)))
= χ1(w
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1)χ1(w(y − ypδ)))
= χ1(w
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1)χ1(wy)χ1(−wypδ)
= χ1(w
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1)χ1(w
pδyp
δ
)χ1(−wypδ)
= χ1(w
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1)χ1(y
pδ(wp
δ − w)).
Therefore we can simplify N into:
N =
∑
w∈Fq
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(w
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1)
∑
y∈Fq
χ1(y
pδ(wp
δ − w)).
The inner sum
∑
y∈Fq χ1(y
pδ(wp
δ − w)) is zero unless wpδ − w = 0. Thus it follows
that
N = q
∑
w∈F
pδ
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(w
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1)
= q +
∑
w∈F ∗
pδ
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(w
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1).
This identity implies that there is a relationship between the number of solutions of
the bivariate polynomial equation g(x, y) = 0 and the Weil sum of f(x), whereby w
is multiplied to f(x) inside the argument of character χ1. In order to further simplify
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it, we must impose several conditions on the types of simplified Dembowski-Ostrom
polynomial f(x) =
∑D
i=1Aix
psi+1. Note that δ is defined as the greatest common
divisor of n and s1, . . . , sD appearing in the exponents of the monomials in f(x).
Although the integers si, 1 ≤ i ≤ D are regarded as the exponents in the simplified
Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial under these conditions, we have a general lemma for
any integer si from elementary number theory.
Lemma 33 (GCD and Exponents. cf. Theorems 1.5. and 1.6 [33]). Let n and
si, 1 ≤ i ≤ D be the nonnegative integers with a greatest common divisor δ =
gcd(s1, . . . , sD, n). Note that the condition that si/δ is odd for each 1 ≤ i ≤ D forces
si to be positive. Assume that n/δ is even and si/δ is odd for each i. Then, we have:
(
2si + 1
2δ + 1
, 2δ − 1) = 1.
Proof Note that Ui = (2
si + 1)/(2δ + 1) for each i and 2δ − 1 are odd, thus l =
gcd(Ui, 2
δ − 1) must be odd. Suppose that l ≥ 3. Since si/δ is odd for each i, we
have:
2si + 1 = (2δ + 1)(2(si/δ−1)δ − 2(si/δ−2)δ + . . .− 2δ + 1),
which implies:
Ui = 2
(si/δ−1)δ − 2(si/δ−2)δ + . . .− 2δ + 1.
By the definition of l, the odd number l divides both Ui and 2
δ − 1, hence l divides
the sum:
Ui + (2
δ − 1) = 2(si/δ−1)δ − 2(si/δ−2)δ + . . .− 23δ + 22δ
= 22δ(2(si/δ−3)δ − 2(si/δ−4)δ + . . .− 2δ + 1).
Because l ≥ 3 is odd, it again divides the second factor (2(si/δ−3)δ − 2(si/δ−4)δ + . . .−
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2δ + 1) in the sum Ui + (2
δ − 1). By repeating this process, l must eventually divide
(22δ − 2δ + 1) + (2δ − 1) = 2δ,
which is a contradiction. (This proof induces the contradiction slightly different from
the proof of Lemma 3.6. in [33]). ¤
Now, we can complete the task left in Lemma 3.6 in [33] for the case p = 2. That
is, we can combine the previously known result when p is an odd prime in [33] to the
case p = 2. The following theorem unifies the case p = 2 and the case that p is an
odd prime.
Theorem 34 (Bivariate Equation. Emulation Condition. Lemma 3.6. [33]). Let Fq
be a finite field of order q = pn, where p is the characteristic, and f(x) a Dembowski-
Ostrom polynomial
∑D
i=1Aix
psi+1 over Fq. Denote by N(g(x, y)) the number of solu-
tions of bivariate equation g(x, y) = f(x) − ypδ + y over Fq × Fq. Suppose that with
δ = (s1, . . . , sD) :
1. n/δ is even,
2. δ = (si, n) for each i,
3. si/δ is odd for each i, and
4. 2δ divides si − sj for all i 6= j.
Then, we have:
N(g(x, y)) = q + (pδ − 1)S,
where S = S(A1, . . . , AD) =
∑
x∈Fq χ1(
∑D
i=1Aix
psi+1): the Weil sum of f(x).
Proof Since ”odd” case is proved in [33], we only show the proof for p = 2. Let us
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start with the identity obtained in the previous discussion:
N = 2n +
∑
w∈F ∗
pδ
∑
x∈Fq
χ1(w
D∑
i=1
Aix
2si+1).
For the integers si’s appearing in the exponents of the polynomial, by Lemma 33 we
have:
(
2si + 1
2δ + 1
, 2δ − 1) = 1
for each i. Multiplying both elements (2si + 1)/(2δ + 1) and 2δ − 1 by 2δ + 1 yields
(2si + 1, 22δ − 1) = 2δ + 1.
Since n/δ is even, we have:
2n − 1 = (2δ + 1)(2(n/δ−1)δ − 2(n/δ−2)δ + . . .+ 2δ − 1)
and the fact that (2δ−1, 2δ+1) = 1 by Lemma 3 (i.e., 2δ−1 and 2δ+1 are relatively
prime). So 2δ+1 must divide (2n−1)/(2δ−1). Let g be an arbitrary primitive element
of Fq (Definition 9). We first want to show that for each i and for any w ∈ F ∗pδ , the
equation:
wz2
si+1
w = 1
is solvable for zw in F22δ . Let us express any w ∈ F ∗2δ for some integer s as:
w = g
s( q−1
2δ−1 )
and set the unknown zw to be solved in F22δ(obviously zw is dependent on w) as:
zw = g
r,
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with some integer r. Consequently, we need to consider the solvability of the equation:
g
s( q−1
2δ−1 )gr(2
si+1) = 1,
for the unknown integer r. Equivalently, we must examine the corresponding linear
congruence equation:
r(2si + 1) ≡ −s q − 1
2δ − 1 mod 2
2δ − 1.
From Lemma 4, this is solvable for r if and only if
(2si + 1, 22δ − 1) divides − s q − 1
2δ − 1 .
Since (2si + 1, 22δ − 1) = (2δ + 1), the linear congruence equation is solvable for r if
and only if:
(2δ + 1) divides − s q − 1
2δ − 1 ,
which is true regardless of the value of s as (2δ + 1) readily divides (q − 1)/(2δ − 1).
(The reader may finally notice why zw is sought in F22δ of size 2
2δ.) Therefore, we
can show that for each i and for any w ∈ F ∗
pδ
, an equation wz2
si+1
w = 1 is solvable for
zw in F22δ .
Next, we need to show that the zw ∈ F22δ in wz2si+1w = 1 for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ D)
also satisfies wz2
sj+1
w = 1 for any j 6= i. In other words, for an arbitrary i, we want
to know whether:
wz2
si+1
w = 1 for some zw ∈ F22δ ⇒ wz2
sj+1
w = 1 for any j 6= i.
Assume that this is true for arbitrarily fixed i. We have the solvable equation
wz2
si+1
w = 1 with some zw ∈ F22δ . By assumption 2δ divides sj − si, so set some
k ∈ Z such that sj − si = 2kδ. Then, for any j 6= i and the solution zw ∈ F22δ of
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wz2
si+1
w = 1, we have:
wz2
sj+1
w = z
−(2si+1)
w z
2sj+1
w = z
2sj−2si
w = (z
2sj−si
w )
2si .
Without loss of generality we assume k is positive. When k ≥ 2, we recursively have:
z2
sj−si
w = z
22δk
w = z
22δ(k−1)
w × · · · × z2
2δ(k−1)
w (2δ times),
while the case k = 1 yields:
z2
sj−si
w = z
22δ
w = 1.
Therefore we have shown that:
wz2
sj+1
w = 1.
Finally, this common solution zw ∈ F ∗22δ for all the equations wz2
si+1
w = 1 for
1 ≤ i ≤ D can further simplify N as follows.
N = 2n +
∑
w∈F ∗
2δ
∑
x∈F2n
χ1(w(
D∑
i=1
Aix
2si+1))
= 2n +
∑
w∈F ∗
2δ
∑
zwx∈F2n
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiw(zwx)
2si+1)
= 2n +
∑
w∈F ∗
2δ
∑
zwx∈F2n
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Ai(wz
2si+1
w )x
2si+1)
= 2n +
∑
w∈F ∗
2δ
∑
zwx∈F2n
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aix
2si+1)
= 2n + (2δ − 1)S(A1, . . . , AD).
Therefore, we obtained the desired result. ¤
The fact that adversary may know the valueN of bivariate equation
∑D
i=1Aix
2si+1 =
y2
δ − y has some implications when f(x) is used in multivariate quadratic trapdoor
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function. To see this assume that (x, y) ∈ Fq × Fq is a solution to the bivariate
equation. Then, the mapping x 7→ f(x) which is supposed to be one-way thus hard
to invert, can be ”emulated” by the linearized mapping y 7→ y2δ − y which is easy
to invert. This observation will be integrated into the attack on trapdoor based on
these forms of D-O polynomials in next section.
In this paper, the conditions in Theorem 34 on the extension degree n of Fq and
the integers s1, . . . , sD appearing in the portions of the exponents of the simplified D-
O polynomial are called the emulation conditions for this cryptanalytic reason. That
is, f(x) =
∑D
i=1Aix
psi+1 over Fpn in Theorem 26 satisfies the emulation conditions
if with δ = (s1, . . . , sD) :

n/δ is even,
δ = (si, n) for each i,
si/δ is odd for each i, and
2δ divides si − sj for allj 6= i.
D. Computation of the Number of Solutions
It is important to note that we do not have an analogue of Theorem 1.4 [33] when
p = 2. On the other hand, when p is an odd prime, there is neither the convenient
lemma such as Lemma 28 nor the straightforward proof such as in the subsequent
Corollary 29 that is applicable even to the simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial
as a central polynomial.
Although we do not need the results of Theorem 1.4 in [33] as they are inappli-
cable to the Weil sum S(A1, . . . , AD) of p = 2, we still want to detail the interesting
proof techniques used in the theorems of [33] by highlighting the fact that the results
of Theorem 1.4 are apparently inapplicable to our new case p = 2.
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Corollary 35 (Inapplicability). Let p be any prime (2 or odd prime) and Fq a finite
field of order q = pn. Let f(x) be a simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial f(x) =∑D
i=1Aix
psi+1) and TD(x) the auxiliary linearized polynomial TD(x) = A
ps1
1 x
p2s1
+
A1x+
∑D
i=2[A
ps1
i x
ps1+si
+(Aix)
ps1+yi ], as is in Theorem 26. Then, for any root w ∈ Fq
of the equation TD(w) = 0 we have:
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiw
psi+1) = χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiw
psi+1).
Proof Since the proof scheme in Mills’ theorem is also applicable to our new case
p = 2, we only highlight the portions of the entire proof in [33] which are not explicitly
described in the paper. Assume that D ≥ 2. We handle the terms i = 1, 2 separately
from the rest terms i ≥ 3 in formula (7) of Mills’ proof. First we have:
D∏
i=1
χ1(Aiw
psi+1) =
D∏
i6=2
χ1(Aiw
ps1+1)χ1([A
ps1
2 w
ps1+s2 − TD(w)]wps1 ).
For the term i = 1 of TD on the right-hand side of the identity , we can simplify as:
χ1(A1w
ps1+1 − [Aps11 wp
2s1 + A1w]w
ps1 ) = χ1(−Aps11 (wp
s1 )p
s1wp
s1 )
= χ1(A
ps1
1 w
ps1+1).
For the term i = 2, we can simplify as:
χ1(−(A2w)ps1+y2wps1 ) = χ1(Apy22 wp
y2+1).
And for terms i ≥ 3, we can simplify as:
χ1(Aiw
psi+1 − (Aps1i wp
s1+si + (Aiw)
ps1+yi )wp
s1 ) = χ1(A
pyi
i w
pyi+1).
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Since we have:
χ1((A
pyi
i w
pyi+1)p
si ) = χ1(Aiw
psi+1)
for each i ≥ 2, we have:
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiw
psi+1) = χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiw
psi+1).
¤
When p is odd, both sides of the obtained equality in Corollary 35 (also in
Theorem 1.4 [33]) are easily shown to be 1. To see this, consider:
exp(
2pii
p
Tr(
D∑
i=1
Aiw
psi+1)) = exp(−{2pii
p
Tr(
D∑
i=1
Aiw
psi+1)}),
where w is a root of TD(w) = 0. Since both sides (complex conjugates) are equal, they
must be real i.e. must be 1 or −1. In addition, Tr(∑Di=1Aiwpsi+1) must be divisible
by odd denominator p, which makes both sides to be 1. If Theorem 26 is applied to
this simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial, we have:
|S|2 = q
∑
TD(w)=0,w∈Fq
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiw
psi+1) = q
∑
TD(w)=0,w∈Fq
1 = qN(TD(x) = 0),
and thus we obtain the actual result of Theorem 1.4 of [33].
However, when p = 2, we do not have to examine if character χ1(f(x)) is real or
not, but the value of χ1(
∑D
i=1Aiw
2si+1) can actually flip between 1 and −1. In other
words, while χ1(f(x)) is always guaranteed to be real by Lemma 28, we cannot get
any analogous convenient result such as |S|2 = 2nN(TD = 0) of Theorem 1.4 in [33]
if p = 2.
Let us end this chapter by providing a customized version of the Weil sum al-
gorithm Algorithm 30 by resolving the sign of the absolute value computed in the
algorithm. Since Weil sum algorithm, Algorithm 30, works on the case p = 2, we
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apply it to the simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial in Theorem 34 to obtain
the Weil sum with p = 2. Unlike the case where p is an odd prime [30, 31, 33], we
have a very simple sign resolution scheme for our case p = 2.
Theorem 36 (Sign of Weil Sum). Let Fq be a finite fields of order q = 2
n, where 2 is
the characteristic, and f(x) a simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial
∑D
i=1Aix
2si+1
over F2n whereby the emulation conditions in Theorem 34 are satisfied. Also let
S = S(A1, . . . , AD) =
∑
x∈F2n χ1(
∑D
i=1Aix
2si+1) be the Weil sum of f(x) while |S|
denote its absolute value calculated by the Weil sum algorithm Algorithm 30. Then,
we have:
S =
 +|S| if 2(1− |S|) ≡ 0 mod 2
δ + 1,
−|S| otherwise.
Proof For the simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial f(x), we have an identity
from Theorem 34:
N = q + (2δ − 1)S,
where N = N(f(x), y2
δ − y) is the number of the solutions of the bivariate equation
f(x) = y2
δ − y in Fq. From Lemma 32, N can be congruently estimated as:
N ≡ −1 mod 2δ + 1.
By combining both identities, we have:
0 ≡ N + 1 ≡ 2(1− S) mod 2δ + 1.
Now, we want to determine the sign of S = ±|S|. Assume that S has a sign +, i.e.,
S = |S|. Then we have the congruence identity:
0 ≡ N + 1 ≡ 2(1− |S|) mod 2δ + 1.
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In this case, the absurdity of assuming − sign for S = −|S| is easily shown because
of the other congruence identity:
0 ≡ N + 1 ≡ 2(1− (−|S|)) mod 2δ + 1
yields a contradiction in the sum with the original identity as:
4 ≡ 0 mod 2δ + 1.
Therefore, S = |S| if and only if 0 ≡ 2(1 − |S|) mod 2δ + 1, and we obtained the
desired result. ¤
Now we can add the result of this sign resolution scheme of Theorem 36 into
the Weil sum algorithm Algorithm 30. In this case the input of the algorithm
must be a simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial with the emulation conditions
in Theorem 34.
Algorithm 37 (Simplified Weil Sum Algorithm. p = 2).
INPUT f(x) =
∑D
i=1Aix
2si+1: Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial over F2n with the
emulation conditions in Theorem 34.
OUTPUT S: Weil sum of f(x).
1. Compute the associated linearized TD(x) ∈ F2n as in Theorem 26 (Suppose l is
the dimension of ker(TD)).
2. Compute the basis {η1, . . . , ηl} of ker(TD).
3. Let U be 0 ∈ Z.
4. Compute γi,j1,j2 = Tr(Aiηj1η
2si
j2
) for 1 ≤ i ≤ D, 1 ≤ j1, j2 ≤ l
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5. For each (x1, . . . , xl) ∈ F l2, evaluate
C(x1,...,xl) =
D∑
i=1
l∑
j1=1
l∑
j2=1
xj1xj2γi,j1,j2 ∈ F2
and set U = U + C(x1,...,xl). (Note: integer addition.)
6. If |S| = 2n/2√2l − 2U satisfies 2(1 − |S| |) ≡ 0 mod 2δ + 1 then return |S|;
otherwise return −|S|.
The time complexity of this modified algorithm is: O(Dl2(n3 + 2l)) time in terms of
the binary operations on RAM. This complexity is similar to that of Theorem 31.
E. Concluding Remarks
Lemma 32 of the batched solutions require only si/δ to be odd in the emulation
conditions for the Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials. All the known methods of the
explicit Weil sum evaluation of Dembwoski-Ostrom polynomial [30, 31, 32, 33] care-
fully separate the four combinations of evenness and oddness for characteristic p and
n/δ. This is mainly because of the subtleties in Lemma 3 regarding the greatest
common divisors.
As is open in [33] for the case where p is an odd prime, it remains an open
question to extend the emulation conditions proposed in Section C to the case n/δ is
odd for p = 2. The sign resolution in Theorem 36 contrasts to that of others when p is
odd. This sign resolution enabled us to obtain the concrete value of the Weil sum of
the Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials under the emulation conditions in Algorithm 37.
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CHAPTER V
SECURITY OF A CLASS OF DEMBOWSKI-OSTROM POLYNOMIALS
A. Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate what kind of mechanism in the cryptosystem design
could potentially affect the security of the multivariate quadratic cryptosystem.
In Section B, we discuss an attack on the short signature schemes based on
the birthday problem in Definition 7. This attack imposes a lower bound of the
size of a cryptosystem design in order to achieve the commonly prescribed security
level of 280. In Section C, we introduce a new customization of the attack in the
previous section on the Demboswki-Ostrom polynomials with emulation conditions
in the generic MQ-trapdoor. It is shown that the new attack could be asymptotically
better than the attack based on the birthday problems for infinitely many possible
extension degree n so that we can characterize the nontrivial class of weak Dembowski-
Ostrom polynomials in the MQ-trapdoor under this new attack.
B. Generic Threats against Digital Signature Scheme
Let Fp and Fq be the finite fields with q = p
n. As usual the extension field Fq is
regarded as a n-dimensional vector space F np over Fp with some fixed basis. We
consider a MQ problem MQ(p, n, n) (Definition 18) of the system of n multivariate
quadratic polynomial equations z = F (x) = (P1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , Pn(x1, . . . , xn)) s.t.
zk = P (x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
α
(k)
i,j xixj +
n∑
i=1
β
(k)
i xi + γ
(k),
where α
(k)
i,j , β
(k)
i , γ
(k) ∈ Fp for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. We also assume that some generic trapdoor
structure is embedded into this system so that the system F = (P1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . ,
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Pn(x1, . . . , xn)) is a public mapping (public key) F
n
p → F np and forms a MQ(p, n, n)-
trapdoor. The actual inversion of the mapping F is feasible only with the knowledge
of the secret functional composition of a central polynomial over Fq and two affine
bijections F np → F np (cf. HFE-trapdoor, Definition 23).
By Lemma 19, there exists a univariate representation over Fq of theMQ(p, n, n)-
trapdoor whose form is identical to that of the central polynomial (Definition 21)
f(x) =
D∑
i=1
aix
pαi+pβi +
L∑
j=1
bjx
pγj + c,
where ai, bi, c ∈ Fq. If the system is homogeneous, we have a unique Dembowski-
Ostrom polynomial (Definition 22):
f(x) =
D∑
i=1
aix
pαi+pβi ,
where ai ∈ Fq to express this MQ(p, n, n)-trapdoor.
ConsiderMQ(p, n, n)-trapdoor that is used for a digital signature scheme. While
the verification of a signature x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ F np is performed with the public
key, F (x) = (P1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , Pn(x1, . . . , xn)), the signing of a (hashed) message
value (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ F np (often with some redundancy) requires knowledge of the
trapdoor information. In a digital signature scheme, the goal of an adversary is to
forge signatures; that is, produce signatures which will be accepted as those of some
other entity. One of the weakest forms of forgeries in digital signature scheme called
existential forgery in the following.
Definition 38 (Existential Forgery, Section 11.24. [2]). An adversary is able to forge
a signature of at least one message over which the adversary has little or no control.
In an existential forgery of digital signature scheme, an attack is considered to be
successful if he can either deterministically or probabilistically counterfeit at least
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one valid signature of some message.
With regard to the types of information and access available to the adversary,
we can categorize the possible modes of attacks.
Definition 39 (Modes of Attacks. Section 11.2.4. [2]) There are two basic attacks
against public-key digital signature scheme.
Key-only attack: An adversary knows only the signer’s public key.
Message attack: An adversary is able to examine signatures corresponding either
to known or chosen messages. Message attacks can be further subdivided into
three classes.
1. Known-message attack: An adversary has signatures for a set of messages
which are known to the adversary but not chosen by him.
2. Chosen-message attack: An adversary obtains valid signatures form a cho-
sen list of messages before attempting to break the signature scheme. This
attack is non-adaptive in the sense that messages are chosen before any
signatures are seen.
3. Adaptive chosen-message attack: An adversary is allowed to use the signer
as an oracle. The adversary may request signatures of messages which de-
pend on the signer’s public key; and he may request signatures of messages
which depend on previously obtain signatures or messages.
In general, an adaptive chosen message attack is one of the strongest modes of at-
tacks on digital signature scheme; and any practical digital signature scheme must
possess (either provably or computationally suggestive) substantial security against
this type of attack. A security parameter is often defined as the (minimum) compu-
tational complexity that the cryptosystem must impose on any possible attacker in
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order to achieve the prescribed security objective. It is currently considered that any
practically useful cryptosystem should have security parameter at least 280 (cf. [3]).
Among the currently known multivariate quadratic schemes which offer very
short signature size, the possibility of a birthday attack is often considered when
selecting the proper size of cryptosystem (in our case, the degree n of extension field
Fpn).
Definition 40 (Birthday Attack. cf. [20]). Let
F (x) = (P1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , Pn(x1, . . . , xn))
be a system of n multivariate polynomials over Fp which represents the corresponding
MQ(p, n, n)-trapdoor F : F np → F np .
A birthday attack on digital signature scheme based on MQ(p, n, n)-trapdoor is
an existential forgery such that an adversary:
1. Generates pn/2 random signature values σi and sorted list {F (σ1), F (σ2), . . . ,
F (σpn/2)},
2. Generates pn/2 random message values mj and sorted list of their hash values
{z1, z2, . . . , zpn/2}, and then
3. Searches for a coincidence F (σi) = zj for some pair (i, j) ∈ [1, pn/2]2.
The time complexity of such an attack is O(pn/2).
In a birthday attack, the adversary generates pn/2 messages for each list. This is
because from the birthday problem Definition 7 the expected number of the elements
to select from Fq of order q = p
n while having no coincidence is approximately:√
pi
2
pn ≈ pn/2.
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Therefore, after pn/2 messages are selected, it is expected that the adversary can find
out at least one coincidence F (σi) = zj for some (i, j) in the two lists.
In short signature schemes such as the ones based on HFE-trapdoor or TTS-
trapdoor, n is usually chosen n > 160 with p = 2 because of the possibility for this
birthday attack with complexity 2n/2 = 280. The birthday attack is a generic attack on
any digital signature scheme based on MQ(p, n, n)-trapdoor, and it does not provide
any insight into the weak key structures which may exist inside the key selection
mechanism of the cryptosystem.
In fact, as is the case for many other known attacks based on equation-solving
such as Gro¨bner basis methods [6], the underlying problem that the birthday attacker
attempts is to solve is also the system of the multivariate quadratic equations. In
other words, from the two lists {F (σ1), F (σ2), . . . , F (σpn/2)} and {z1, z2, . . . , zpn/2},
the birthday attack seeks for at least one solution of some equation:
F (x) = z,
with the two variables x, z ∈ F np × F np . This crucial fact that a birthday attack is
equivalently seeking for at least one root of the bivariate polynomial g(x, z) = f(x)−z
over Fq × Fq is the primary motivation for considering our weak key identification
scheme in the following sections.
It is also interesting to note that, in contrast to many other algebraic attacks,
the time complexity of birthday attack does not depend on the degree of f(x) in the
univariate form or other intermediate polynomials during the computation, which
greatly contrasts to those of many other algebraic attacks whose time complexity
often depends on the degree of the polynomials.
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C. A Class of Weak Dembowski-Ostrom Polynomials
From the previous observation it is shown that the birthday attacker actually seeks
for a solution of the corresponding bivariate equation over Fq × Fq:
g(x, z) = f(x)− z,
where f(x) =
∑D
i=1 aix
pαi+pβi +
∑L
j=1 bjx
pγj + c is a central polynomial. Our goal is
to develop a systematic detection method for some class of the Dembowski-Ostrom
polynomials of simplified form (Theorem 34):
f(x) =
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1
whose security is less than the birthday attack security parameter
√
pi
2
pn ≈ pn/2 in
Definition 40. Let us now start to characterize this class of the weak polynomial
structures.
1. Number of Dembowski-Ostrom Polynomials
Let f(x) be a secret Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial:
f(x) =
D∑
i=1
Aix
psi+1 = A1x
ps1+1 + · · ·+ ADxpsD+1,
where D ≥ 1, Ai ∈ Fq for 1 ≤ i ≤ D and 0 ≤ s1 < s2 < . . . < sD ≤ q − 1. It
is easy to show that there are q
Dq(D)
D!
simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial in
MQ(p, n, n)-trapdoor. Henceforth, we consider MQ(2, n, n) of the case q = 2n.
Among these simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials, the crucial conditions
for the si’s in Theorem 34 are applied to determine the scope of the subset K. That
is, we consider a class of simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials: with D ≥ 1 and
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δ = (s1, . . . , sD, n) such that:
K = {
D∑
i=1
Aix
2si+1, n/δ even, δ = (si, n), si/δ odd, 2δ divides si − sj}.
This subset K is the set of Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials among all the possible
central polynomials in MQ(2, n, n)-trapdoors from which we attempt to identify the
polynomials (asymptotically) weaker than birthday attack security parameter.
2. Linearized Binomial Attack on Dembowski-Ostrom Polynomials
In order to define the class of Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials in K weaker than
birthday attack parameter, we must determine an attack which is stronger than the
birthday attack against the polynomials. Suppose that f(x) is a Dembowski-Ostrom
polynomial in K, which is built into MQ(2, n, n)-trapdoor. Now, consider a scenario
in which the number of solutions N of the associated bivariate equation:
f(x) = y2
δ − y,
over F2n × F2n is substantially large for the mapping f : F2n → F2n . As is shown in
Lemma 32, if x 6= 0 is a nonzero solution (x, y) ∈ F2n × F2n with some y, then for
any w ∈ F2n with w2δ+1 = 1, (wx, y) is also a solution. In other words, each nonzero
x 6= 0 of solution (x, y) resides in the batch of each size 2δ + 1 in F2n .
In fact, it is followed that the partition by these batches induces an equivalence
relation in F ∗2n . I.e. for any x, x
′ ∈ F ∗2n (i.e., nonzero solutions),
x ≈ x′ ⇐⇒ ∃w s.t. x′ = wx, and w2δ+1 = 1.
Here, note that since n/δ is even, 2δ +1 divides 2n− 1. Therefore, we can obtain the
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set of equivalence classes: B1, B2, . . . , BT of each size 2
δ + 1 in F ∗2n such that:
Bi ∩Bj = ∅, and
⋃
1≤i≤T
Bi = F
∗
2n ,
with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ T and T = 2n−1
2δ+1
.
Assume that t ∈ Z is the number of the classes Bi in F ∗2n such that any element
of the classes are actually the solutions of the bivariate equation; that is, there exist
t equivalent classes:
Bi1 , Bi2 , . . . , Bit
whose elements are the solutions of f(x) = y2
δ − y. If we randomly pick up an
arbitrary element x from F ∗2n , x may belong to some class Bi of the solutions at
probability t
T
. Therefore, after approximately T
t
random choices, it is expected that
we can pick up at least one solution x in some solution class Bi. Note that for this
x ∈ Bi, we have:
f(x) ∈ Im(L),
where Im(L) is the image of mapping L : y 7→ y2δ − y over F2n . In other words, after
T/t random selection of x ∈ F ∗2n , we will obtain at least one element f(x) that is
located inside Im(L). Since L(y) = y2
δ − y is a linearized polynomial with kernel
of size 2δ, the image Im(L) ⊆ F2n is of size 2n−δ. Therefore, it follows that after
approximately T/t random generations of values f(x), we will have some element
f(x) in F2n which is also inside Im(L).
Now, we ready for applying the birthday attack in Definition 40 on this range
Im(L) of size 2n−δ in F2n . Assume that the attack seeks the nonzero solutions x 6= 0
of (x, y) ∈ Fq×Fq by working on the secret simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial
f(x) ∈ K which represents the MQ(2, n, n)-trapdoor F (x) = (P1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . ,
Pn(x1, . . . , xn)).
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Definition 41 (Linearized Binomial Attack. Univariate Form). Let F2n be a finite
field with even extension degree n with some fixed basis as vector space F n2 . Sup-
pose f(x) is an arbitrary simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial in K under the
emulation conditions in Theorem 34 which expresses the corresponding MQ(2, n, n)-
trapdoor F (x) = (P1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , Pn(x1, . . . , xn)) over F
n
2 . Then, a linearized bi-
nomial attacker performs the following:
1. Randomly guess the value of the unknown δ = (s1, . . . , sD, n) from {1, . . . , n}.
This δ allows the adversary to fix a linearized binomial L(y) = y2
δ − y in Fq[y].
We denote by Im(L) the image of the mapping L over Fq.
2. Generate T
t
2
n−δ
2 random elements x ∈ Fq and obtain the list:
{f(x1), f(x2), . . . , f(xT
t
2
n−δ
2
)}.
3. Generate 2
n−δ
2 random elements z ∈ Im(L) to obtain the list:
{z1, . . . , z
2
n−δ
2
}.
4. Search for a coincidence f(xj) = zi for some i, j in the two lists.
To analyze how the linearized binomial attack works on the simplified Dembowski-
Ostrom polynomial f(x) in K, suppose that some pair (x, y = L−1(z)) ∈ F2n ×F2n is
a solution of the associated bivariate equation:
f(x) = y2
δ − y,
over F2n × F2n . Then by regarding the signature value as σ = x and hashed message
value as z = y2
δ − y, we obtain:
f(σ) = z,
in the corresponding univariate representation ofMQ(2, n, n)-trapdoor F : F n2 → F n2 .
In other words, (L(y), x) = (z, σ) must be a valid message-signature pair of this
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scheme, and this attack forms the existential forgery when successful. It can also be
considered as a chosen message attack (Definition 39) against the scheme since the
adversary restricts to a subset Im(L) of the entire F2n the range for the messages zj
against which he expects to find a coincidence with some f(σi).
It should be emphasized that the linearized binomial attacker must generate
T
t
2
n−δ
2 > 2
n−δ
2 elements x’s for their images f(x)’s in order to obtain the list
{f(x1), f(x2), . . . , f(xT
t
2
n−δ
2
)}
in which at least 2
n−δ
2 elements are expected to be inside Im(L). Note also that since
δ is guessed from {1, . . . , n}, the total time complexity:
O(n× T
t
2
n−δ
2 )
is necessary for the adversary so as to have the expected number of at least one
coincidence in the two lists.
One of the advantages for the linearized binomial attack for this special class of
D-O polynomials is that the linearized polynomial y2
δ − y ∈ Fq[y] on the right-hand
side is a binomial, and thus just guessing the values of δ allows us to emulate the
D-O polynomial f(x) on the left-hand side over the solution space. That is, randomly
generated 2
n−δ
2 out of T
t
2
n−δ
2 elements f(xi) ∈ F2n are, indeed, expected to be gathered
inside Im(L) of size 2n−δ. Since the extension degree n is always specified and fixed,
this random guessing is, in fact, very efficient. (See the observation on δ later in
the chapter. One can often regard δ as a small constant in many cases.) When this
complexity nT
t
2
n−δ
2 is smaller than the birthday security parameter
√
pi
2
2n/2 (Fact 2.27.
[2]) the linearized binomial attack is more successful against the D-O polynomial f(x)
than normal birthday attack.
One interesting aspect of this approach is that we can analyze the exact number
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of solutions of the bivariate equation from Theorem 34 by the explicit Weil sum values.
To see this, recall that for the class of D-O polynomials in Theorem 34, we have the
exact number t of the batches of the solutions. That is, for N we have:
N = (2δ + 1)t+ 2δ,
from Lemma 32 (t is the number of solution batches) and:
N = 2n + (2δ − 1)S,
from Theorem 34 with Weil sum S =
∑
x∈F2n χ1(
∑D
i=1Aix
2si+1). Therefore, we can
now apply the Weil sum Algorithm 37 of Weil sum of the simplified D-O polynomial
in order to obtain the exact values of S and t of f(x).
Furthermore, in contrast to Gro¨bner basis attack, the complexity of the linearized
binomial attack does not depend on the degree of the intermediate polynomial ap-
pearing in the computation. Instead, the computational complexity required by the
attack here is closely related to the size of the greatest common divisor δ of the
portions of exponents s1, . . . , sD and, as was shown in the simplified Weil sum algo-
rithm 37, the dimension l of the kernel of the auxiliary linearized polynomial TD(x)
in Theorem 34.
In sum, on the basis of the observation regarding the subjectivity of Dembowski-
Ostrom polynomials to this attack, we can characterize the class of weak Dembowski-
Ostrom polynomials in K under the emulation conditions in the following.
Theorem 42 (Weak Dembowski-Ostrom Polynomial). Let F2n be a finite extension
field of F2 with extension degree n even. Let K be the class of Dembowski-Ostrom poly-
nomial f(x) =
∑D
i=1Aix
2si+1 over F2n, each of which satisfies the following emulation
conditions: with δ = (s1, . . . , sD, n)
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1. n/δ is even.
2. δ = (si, n) for each i,
3. si/δ is odd for each i, and
4. 2δ divides si − sj for all j 6= i.
And also let N be the number of solutions of bivariate equation f(x) = yδ − y over
F2n × F2n and suppose that the birthday security parameter is
√
pi
2
2n. Then, if f(x)
is such that
N > 2δ + n
√
2
pi
2−δ/2(2n − 1),
f(x) is a weak Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial and is subject to the linearized binomial
attack in time less than
√
pi
2
2n.
As is previously mentioned, the classification of these weak polynomials involves
the actual computation of Weil sum by Algorithm 37. In order to obtain N in the
relation:
N = 2n + (2δ − 1)S,
of Theorem 34, we need the actual computation of the Weil sum value:
S =
∑
x∈F2n
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aix
si+1),
by the simplified Weil sum algorithm Algorithm 37 (which must resolves the sign
as well). Nevertheless, it is also easily shown that in some particular combina-
tions of the parameters used in the simplified Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial f(x) =∑D
i=1Aix
2si+1 of the emulation conditions Theorem 34 in MQ(2, n, n)-trapdoor, the
linearized binomial attack can be asymptotically better than standard birthday at-
tack.
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Lemma 43 Suppose n ∈ N is even and arbitrarily fixed. Let F2n be a finite field
of MQ(2, n, n)-trapdoor and f(x) =
∑D
i=1Aix
2si+1 be a Dembowski-Ostrom polyno-
mial satisfying the emulation conditions in Theorem 34 that represents MQ(2, n, n)-
trapdoor. Then, for 1 ≤ i ≤ D there exists a combination of D and si such that:
δ = n/4.
Proof Consider the case D = 2. For every integer i ≥ 1, define the even extension
degree n of F2n over F2 and (s1, s2): exponents of f(x) such that:
n = 4i,
s1 = i,
s2 = 3i.
It is easily shown that we have the valid emulation conditions:

δ = (s1, n) = (s2, n) = i,
n/δ = 4 : even ,
s1/δ = 1 odd , s2/δ = 3 odd and
2δ = 2i divides |s2 − s1|.
Therefore δ = n/4. ¤
Moreover, we can obtain another theoretical estimate on the possible existence of
the weak Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials under the linearized binomial attack, even
when we take the Weil sum value S into consideration. To see this, recall that from
Theorem 26, we have:
|S|2 = 2n
∑
TD(w)=0,w∈F2n
χ1(
D∑
i=1
Aiw
2si+1).
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From this we have:
|S| ≤ 2n+l2 ,
where l = rank(ker(TD)) is the dimension of the kernel of the auxiliary linearized
polynomial TD. Suppose that we want to evaluate the relative sizes in the inequality
comparing the complexities of the linearized binomial attack and birthday attack:
nT
t
2
n−δ
2 < 2n/2,
(Note: for simplicity we omit
√
pi/2 ≈ 1.2533 · · · ). Since we have:
T =
2n − 1
2δ + 1
and t =
1
2δ + 1
{2n − 2δ + (2δ − 1)S},
alternatively, we need to check if the inequality:
n(2n − 1)
2n − 2δ + (2δ − 1)S · 2
n−δ
2 < 2n/2
is satisfied. Thus, equivalently we want to check if:
S >
1
2δ/2(2δ − 1){−(2
δ/2 − n)2n − n+ 2 3δ2 }.
It is easy to see that the right-hand side of this inequality is negative for reasonably
large n, when we put, for example, δ = n/16 < 0.1n which is substantially smaller
than n. That is, in this case any Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials f(x) of the emula-
tion conditions with positive Weil sum S on the left-hand side will surely satisfy the
inequality. Of course, the value S is in between ±2n+l2 for p = 2 and is also dependent
on the dimension l of the kernel of the auxiliary linearized polynomial TD(x) of f(x).
However, while acknowledging the striking difference between the cases of p = 2
and odd prime p in regard to the proof methodology in explicit Weil sum evalu-
ation [30, 31, 33], we have the results of Theorem 1.4 in [33] for Fpn with odd p
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implying that the Weil sum is:
S = ±pn+l2 ,
under the identical form and emulation conditions of simplified Dembowski-Ostrom
polynomial f(x) =
∑D
i=1Aix
psi+1 over Fpn . That is, in odd p, the value of S can be
either p
n+l
2 or −pn+l2 . Since we know that δ can be as large as n/4 (Lemma 43), this
observation implies the highly probable existence of the weak Dembowski-Ostrom
polynomials under the linearized binomial attacks and if such polynomials exist with
some δ = kn, the attack complexity is less than O(2n/2) by at least the factor of 2−
kn
2 .
Furthermore, it is also easily observed that δ = (s1, . . . , sD, n) tends to remain
small as D gets bigger. Therefore, in the time complexity n × T
t
2
n−δ
2 of linearized
binomial attack we can often ignore the factor n by discretionarily setting δ from 1
and then working upward from there.
D. Concluding Remarks
Theorem 26 on the relation between the number of the solutions of the bivariate poly-
nomial equations and the Weil sum values turned out to be crucial for the emulation
of the Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials by the linearized binomials. Although the
domain of weak Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials subject to the linearized binomial
attacks are limited to those satisfying the emulation conditions, the cryptanalysis
achieves asymptotic improvement of the birthday attacks on these polynomials. As
Lemma 43 shows, the value δ can be as large as a quarter of the extension degree n.
It remains an open question to extend the emulation conditions on the oddness of
n/δ with p = 2 proposed in Theorem 34 so that the scope of the linearized binomial
attack might be further generalized.
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CHAPTER VI
EXPERIMENT AND VARIATIONS
A. Introduction
In this chapter we will provide the simple experimental proof for the existence of
some weakest type of Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials under the linearized binomial
attack as Theorem 42. We also provide the brief specification of our implementa-
tion of the Weil sum Algorithm 37. We also consider some extensions of the Weak
Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial into more general forms under the equivalence (by
linear substitution of indeterminates).
B. Program Specification
The machine used for the experiments in this chapter is our personal computer which
has a single Pentium 4 processor of 2GHz with 650 RAM. We installed a free portable
C++ library NTL (A Library for doing Number Theory) by Shoup [51] for finite field
operations in conjunction with GMP(the GNU Multi-Precision library [52]). We also
used the public source codes of the textbook by Kreher and Stinson [53] for gray code
generation algorithm.
There are two primary steps in the experiments. First, for simplicity, we generate
all valid Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials in the simplified form (cf. 25) with the
exponents satisfying the emulation conditions in Theorem 42 with coefficients 1 in
F2n . More specifically, for a given (n,D), we assign the subset of K′ of the Dembowski-
Ostrom polynomials over F2n as:
K′ = {
D∑
i=1
x2
si+1, n/δ even, δ = (si, n), si/δ odd, 2δ divides si − sj}.
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In order to obtain all of the valid portions of exponents {s1, . . . , sD} under the em-
ulation conditions (cf. Theorem 42), we generated all the possible D-subsets out of
the integers [0, n− 1] and checked them against the emulation conditions.
Next, we apply the Weil sum Algorithm 37 for simplified Dembowski-Ostrom
polynomials f(x) in K′. The following pseudo-code is the main portion of the Weil
sum algorithm after computing the kernel of the auxiliary linearized polynomial of
f(x) in K′ is determined with kernel basis eta in F2n of dimension ker_dim.
\label{codes}
// Step 4. Gamma (Note A[i] = 1, case ker_dim > 0)
for(int i=0; i < D; i++)
for(int j1=0; j1 < ker_dim; j1++)
for (int j2=0; j2 < ker_dim; j2++) { // A[i] = 1
gamma[i][j1][j2]
= trace(eta[j1] * power(eta[j2],(long)exp2(s[i])));
};
// End Step 4
// Step 5: Parity Checking
GF2 C; // parity in GF2 () for(int j= 0; j <(1 << ker_dim); j++){
// Gray codes(Kreher and Stinson). Set coeff in Step 6.
unsigned int T = GrayCodeUnrank(ker_dim, j);
Get_gray_vecGF2(x, ker_dim, T);
C = 0; // parity in GF2
for(int i=0; i<D; i++){
for(int j1=0; j1 < ker_dim; j1++){
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for (int j2=0; j2 < ker_dim; j2++){ // Loop. Step 6.
// Note: Addition in GF2
C += x[j1] * x[j2] * gamma[i][j1][j2];
};
};
};
U += IsOne(C); // Note: GF2 to ZZ by the method of class GF2E.
}; //End Step 5.
// Step 6: Sign Resolution
// Absolute value S_abs
S_abs = (long)exp2(n/2) * SqrRoot((long)exp2(ker_dim) - 2 * U);
if ((2*(1 + S_abs)) % ((long)exp2(delta)+1) == 0) // PLUS
S = S_abs;
else if ((2*(1 - S_abs)) % ((long)exp2(delta)+1) == 0) // MINUS
S = -S_abs;
return S;
//End Step 6.
Since the time complexity of Algorithm 37 is O(Dl2(n3 + 2l))-time in terms of the
binary operations on RAM, the most time-consuming portion is Step 5 which goes
through all the possible gray codes of dimension ker_dim. As was stated in Algo-
rithm 30, however, no complex number computation is performed when computing
the Weil sum S. Note also that the sign resolution for the Weil sum S with its absolute
value S_abs in Step 6 is quite simple, as shown in Theorem 36.
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C. Existence of Weak Dembowski-Ostrom Polynomials
Since we have Lemma 43 regarding the size of δ and the asymptotic improvement by
the linearized binomial attack, we made a simple simulation of the toy-sized example
of the Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials f(x) in K′ forD = 2. The size of the extension
degree of F2n is taken up to n = 24. In this example, the combination of parameters
in Lemma 43 is expected to give the improved efficiency of linearized binomial attack
on f(x) by factor of 2δ/2 = 2n/8.
Table I. The Parameters of Weak Dembowski-Ostrom Polynomials (D = 2, δ = n/4).
n 8 12 16 20 24
δ 2 3 4 5 6
(s1, s2) (2, 6) (3,9) (4,12) (5, 15) (6, 18)
[xd] 16,1,1,16 64,1,1,64 256,1,1,256 1024,1,1,1024 4096,1,1,4096
N 1,024 32,768 1,048,576 33,554,432 1,073,741,824
Nlow 817 13,868 209,151 2,957,690 40,154,700
S 256 4,096 65,536 1,048,576 16,777,216
The row [xd] in the above table indicates all of the tuples of the degrees: (221 , 21,
2s1+s2 , 2s1+y2) of the four monomials originally assigned in the auxiliary linearized
polynomial:
T2(x) = x
22s1
+ x+ x
2s1+s2
+ x2
s1+y2 .
The row Nlow is the integer portion of the right-hand side of the identity given in
Theorem 42, i.e., the actual value:
2δ + n
√
2
pi
2−δ/2(2n − 1),
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with the δ and n in the same column in the table.
The above table shows that even though we set all the coefficients 1 in f(x) =
x2
s1+1+ x2
s2+1, the Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials with the combination of param-
eters in Lemma 43 are always weak against the linearized binomial attack criteria in
Theorem 42. It is easily expected that when D gets larger, δ may be restrained to be
small with respect to n. Therefore the case in the table can be considered as one of the
most extreme cases of the security of the Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials, whereby
the largest asymptotic gain can be achieved by the linearized binomial attack.
It is also interesting to note that all the auxiliary linearized polynomial in the
table have:
T2(x) = x
22s1
+ x+ x
2s1+s2
+ x2
s1+y2 = 0.
That is, each T2(x) is a zero polynomial. This situation occurs simply because we
assumed A1 = A2 = 1 in F2n and for this quite sparse case D = 2, all of the four
monomials assigned in T2(x) occasionally got paired with each other (see the row
xd in the table) and canceled out the coefficients with arithmetic 1 + 1 = 0 ∈ F2n .
Consequently, the kernel of T2(x) is the entire F2n itself so that we had to loop Step 5
in the parity checking portion for all possible gray codes of dimension ker_dim = n.
Therefore, it is easily observed that if we assign the general values in F2n to the
coefficients Ai this cancelation should be infrequent. So the size l should tend to be
much smaller than n and it will lead to the better efficiency in loop Step 5.
We explicitly list the weak Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials with δ = n/4 in
Table C.
• For n = 8, f(x) = x22+1 + x26+1 = x5 + x65 in F28 [x].
• For n = 12, f(x) = x23+1 + x29+1 = x9 + x513 in F212 [x].
• For n = 16, f(x) = x24+1 + x212+1 = x17 + x4097 in F216 [x].
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• For n = 20, f(x) = x25+1 + x215+1 = x33 + x32769 in F220 [x].
• For n = 24, f(x) = x26+1 + x218+1 = x65 + x262145 in F224 [x].
We conjecture from the above that the simplified D-O polynomials defined as:
f(x) = x2
n/4+1 + x2
3n/4+1 ∈ F2n [x] (6.1)
with n = 4i, i ≥ 2 from Lemma 43 form an infinite series of weak D-O polynomials
of Theorem 42.
D. Variations of Weak Dembowski-Ostrom Polynomials
For any linearized polynomial L(x) ∈ F2n [x] and any D-O polynomial f(x) ∈ F2n [x]
the compositions L ◦ f(x) and f ◦ L(x) are D-O polynomials. It is easy to see that
since there are
∏n−1
i=0 (2
n − 2i) invertible n × n-matrices over F2, there are the same
number of the corresponding invertible linearized polynomials in F2n [x]. In addition,
the reduction of D-O polynomial in F2n [x] by x
2n − x is again a D-O polynomial
and the number of the solutions of the equations is identical. I.e., given f(x) an
arbitrary D-O polynomial and let f(x) be a reduction of f(x) by x2
n − x, then for
some q(x), f(x) ∈ F n2 [x] we have f(x) = q(x)(x2n − x) + f(x) where deg(f) ≤ 2n − 1
and thus we have: for (x, z) ∈ F2n × F2n f(x) = z iff f(x) = z.
If one could take some invertible affine 2-polynomial A(x) = L(x) + b ∈ F2n [x]
(Definition 3.54 [19]), compositions and reduction above may lead to some (central)
polynomial f(x) =
∑D
i=1 aix
2αi+2βi +
∑L
j=1 bjx
2γi + c, (D,L ∈ N , ai, bj, c ∈ F2n ,
αi ≤ βi, 2αi + 2βi , 2γi ≤ 2n − 1). More explicitly by using (6.1) we obtain the
equivalent polynomials
f(x) = A(x)2
n/4+1 + A(x)2
3n/4+1 mod x2
n − x, or (6.2)
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f(x) = A(x2
n/4+1 + x2
3n/4+1) mod x2
n − x (6.3)
with an arbitrary invertible affine 2-polynomials A(x) ∈ F2n [x]. It is easy to see that
we can input this f(x) in linearized binomial attack of Definition 41 and N(f, y2
δ −
y) = N(f, y2
δ − y) still holds. Therefore, we can regard f(x) as a weak polynomial
according to Theorem 42. (The use of Formula (6.3) needs more care when emulating
by y2
n − y because A(x) is composed to f(x) from the left.)
Note that these polynomials were neither explicitly known nor evaluated its secu-
rity by any other previous multivariate quadratic schemes in the literature including
Gro¨bner basis methods [6]. Thus, the precise complexity analysis of other methods
including Gro¨bner basis methods is left as an interesting open problem. For instance,
the performance of the Gro¨bner basis method [6] on the HFE system could differ
from the randomly generated MQ problems mainly because HFE could take degree
less than some predetermined upper bound. On the other hand, the degrees of the
polynomials of (6.2) or (6.3) can varies according to an composed invertible affine
2-polynomial A(x). In fact, we may randomly choose a out of
∏n−1
i=0 (2
n − 2i) + 2n
invertible affine 2-polynomials, and some of them can have the shape of HFE polyno-
mials with proper choice of A(x). Therefore, in certain specific cases Gro¨bner basis
methods might perform merely exponentially in extension degree n of F2 against the
corresponding systems of quadratic equations.
As a result, when multivariate quadratic schemes (such as STS and variations: [10,
11, 12]. UOV and others: [13, 14, 9]) are attempting to provide ”short” signature
schemes, the security under birthday attack or customized methods such as linearized
binomial attack (Definition 41) becomes more crucial. Therefore, we must carefully
examine the potential existence of weak polynomials as partially shown in this pa-
per in addition to the security under other potential (algebraic) attacks. Since our
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results indicate that these weak D-O polynomials and their equivalent forms might
exist regardless of size n, any MQ-based short signatures should explicitly eliminate
such weak polynomial instances from its key generation algorithms.
Another open question, beside the conjecture of the existence of infinite series
of (6.1) is to enumerate all the possible weak D-O polynomials defined by Theorem
42 and obtain their equivalent forms under all possible invertible affine 2-polynomials
(with reduction by x2
n−x). ForD > 2 one expects the value δ may tend to be smaller,
but we may still obtain the linearized binomial attacks of asymptotic improvements
by 2δ/2.
E. Concluding Remarks
We implemented the Weil sum Algorithm 37 and empirically showed the existence
of the class of weak Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial characterized in Theorem 42
under the linearized binomial attack. Although it is still an open question whether
the Table C can be extended into the infinitely many large n, we complete the proof
of existence of the class of weak Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials in Theorem 42 in
Chapter V by performing a simulation of the most extreme cases from Lemma 43.
In this case, the linearized binomial attack is asymptotically better than the generic
birthday attack on the Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials under these conditions by
factor of at least 2n/8.
We also described the possible variations of the weak polynomials under the
equivalence relations and provided some observations of the security of these polyno-
mials under the other attacks such Gro¨bner basis methods. Although the experiment
were not meant to be exhaustive, we could partially demonstrated by simulation that
the weak Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials of formula (6.1) are likely to exist for n of
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arbitrary size.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
We proposed a new cryptanalytic application of Weil sum by developing the explicit
Weil sum method, its algorithm and the formulas for the number of solutions of the
associate bivariate equations. The customized birthday attack in this paper proposes
a new way to solve the special subclass of the system of multivariate quadratic equa-
tions by using the univariate polynomial representation. The analysis can be done
in the univariate representation, but the method is applicable to the corresponding
multivariate mapping F n2 → F n2 . The principle behind this analysis is fundamentally
different from those by Gro¨bner basis computation (cf. [6]). Therefore, the applica-
tion of Weil sums of this type for solving systems of multivariate equations may be
of independent interest.
The parity checking-styled Weil sum Algorithm 30 in Chapter III can avoid the
complex number calculation for finite fields of characteristic p = 2. The algorithm
computes the absolute values of the Weil sums of the generic univariate polynomials
which fully characterize MQ problem of n polynomials in n indeterminates over F2. In
Chapter IV, we developed a theorem which relates the Weil sum value to the number
of solutions of the bivariate equation in Theorem 34. The sign resolution in Theorem
36 contrasts to that of others when p is odd and enabled us to obtain the concrete
value of the Weil sum of the Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials under the emulation
conditions in Algorithm 37.
A new attack called linearized binomial attack was developed in Definition 41
which characterizes the weak Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials in MQ problem (The-
orem 42). Although the domain of weak Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials under the
linearized binomial attacks are limited to the emulation conditions, the cryptanalysis
90
can achieve an asymptotic improvement from the birthday attacks on these polynomi-
als. A simple case in Lemma 43 shows that the value δ can be as large as a quarter of
the extension degree n. Also, unlike the previously known algebraic attacks including
those based on the Gro¨bner basis algorithms, the time complexity does not depend
on the degree of the polynomials.
In Chapter VI, we complete the proof of existence of the class of weak Dembowski-
Ostrom polynomials in Theorem 42 by performing a simple computer simulation of
the weakest Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials of Lemma 43. In this case, the lin-
earized binomial attack is asymptotically better than the generic birthday attack on
the Dembowski-Ostrom polynomials under these conditions by factor of at least 2n/8.
In the case when central mapping or polynomial is not a permutation polynomial
the number of solutions of equation f(x) = z over F2n has a certain probability
distribution (cf. Theorem 6.16 and 6.17 [19]). Therefore, the information regarding
the number of the solutions of the generated equations f(x) = z at each step in
collision search may allow adversaries to mount some sort of adaptive attack (Section
11.2.4. [2]). For example, if f(x) is a weak DO polynomial or its equivalent polynomial
then the adversary may adaptively restrict the generation of (hashed) message in F2n
into a subset of the entire range for the messages z against which he expects to
more easily find a coincidence with some f(x). That is, such adaptive attacks may
deliberately select z ∈ F2n of larger |f−1(z)| so that the random selection of x ∈ F2n
could more likely satisfy f(x) = z.
One of the design principles that this paper indicates is that one should select
the MQ trapdoor of high balance [54] in order to resist birthday attack. Interestingly
from this point of view, the permutation monomial x2
α+1 over F2n with gcd(α, n) = 1
is of balance 1 so in principle, the complexity of birthday attack should follow the
common notion of square root complexity O(2n/2). Coulter et al. [29] discovered a
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new class of D-O permutation polynomials. Thus, it is an open question if one can
build a new extension of MI schemes with these permutation polynomials.
Although we handled only p = 2 of the base field F2, the weak D-O polynomials
such as in Table C are expected to exist for infinitely many n. And also, the birthday
paradox techniques used in this paper are quite general and widely applicable in many
other cryptanalytic problems. Therefore, key generation algorithms for multivariate
quadratic cryptosystems should explicitly deal with these weak D-O polynomials and
their equivalent instances in the design specifications, especially for short signature
schemes.
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